SATYA CHARAN DAS Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ALTER hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and after going through the: records of the case and the order-sheet set in particular, we are afraid that if we allow this prosecution to draw' on any further in the manner it has dragged on so long, this court would be a party to an infraction of [he fundamental right of the petitioner granted under article 21 of the Constitution of speedy public trial. It is now well settled that right to personal liberty under Article 21 comprehends a right of the accused to have a speedy and expeditious trial. No citation should be necessary for this proposition well settled in our constitutional jurisprudence, but yet reference may be made to a full Bench Decision of the Patna High Court in Madheswar bhari Singh vs. Slate (AIR 1986 Patna 324) where some of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court on the point have been referred to and relied on.

(2.) IT is apparent from the face of the record that the accused is lacing this trial for about seventeen years. From the order sheet we have not been able to glean any good or sufficient cause which stood in the way of the trial being expedited in the manner it ought to have been. That being so we have to hold that this prosecution can no longer be allowed to continue and must be quashed.

(3.) MR. Mukherjee learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn our attention to the recent amendment to Section 245 of the Code of Criminal procedure whereby a new sub-section (3) has been added to the Section 245 providing that "if all the evidence referred to in Section 245 are not produced in support of the prosecution within four years from the date of the appearance of the accused, the Magistrate shall discharge the accused unless the prosecution satisfies the Magistrate that upon the evidence already produced and for special reasons there is ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of Justice to discharge the accused. This West Bengal amendment has come into force with effect from 14th March, 1989. This is virtually a legislative recognition of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in considering Article 21 to the effect that speedy trial is a part of our fundamental right under Article 21. True, there should be no manner of doubt that this new sub-section shall apply to all pending proceedings. Because this is settled beyond doubt that amendment of adjective law always operates retrospectively.