S M ROY Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under section 401 read with section 482 for setting aside the order dated 4.6.90 passed by the learned 4th Additional Special Court, Calcutta in Special Case No. 6 of 1982 rejecting the petitioner's application under the newly inserted section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and for quashing the impugned proceeding.

(2.) The petitioner was Sales Manager, Central Marketing Organisation Steel Authority of India Limited, Calcutta and worked in that capacity till November 1980. The petition of complaint was filed in the Court of the learned Judge, 4th Special Court, Calcutta on 22.9.82 under section 5(1)(c) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging inter alia that the petitioner possessed assets disproportionate to his known source of income. The accused petitioner appeared on 26.11.82 and the case is still pending. As the evidence was not completed within 4 years from the date of appearence of the petitioner, the petitioner filed an application under section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (as amended) for discharge of the petitioner. By Order No. 99 dated 4.6.90 the learned Judge rejected the application on the grounds that all the material witnesses had already been examined and only the Investigating Officer remained to be examined. The Investigating Officer had already been examined in part. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Judge was of the opinion that it would not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused at this stage when all the material witnesses excepting the I.O. have been examined.

(3.) Mr. Sanyal, learned Advocate of the petitioner has contended that the learned Judge has committed an error in not discharging the accused in accordance with the mandatory provisions of section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He has further contended that the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed on two other grounds also : Firstly, there has been unusual delay of about 8 years in violation of the fundamental right of the accused to a speedy and expeditions trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution causing untold sufferings to the petitioner. Secondly, it has been contended that the check period has been taken from 30.11.60 to 29.11.80 ignoring the previous period of service from 1945 and as such the prosecution is not maintainable.