JUSTICE S A MASOOD Vs. UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE challenge of the writ petitioners is mainly against the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 of the Syndicate of the calcutta University (for short the University hereafter) whereby the management and control of the Surendranath College of Law (for short the said law College) was taken over by the University and also against the interference with the possessory rights of the legally and validly constituted Governing body and/or Trustees of the said Law College pursuant to the aforesaid resolution of the syndicate the case of the petitioners, in brief are as follows : -The petitioners nos. 2 to 8 are the Trustees of the Surendranath Group of Educational Institutions, the said Law College, Surendranath College, both day and Evening. Surendranath College for Wonrten and Surendranath primary and Secondary School for Boys and Girls separately. The aforesaid group of Institutions was run and managed by the Trustees in accordance with the Deed of Trust. The said Law College was established by Rashtraguru surendra Banerjee in the year 1874. The said Law College was formaly known as "ripon College of Law" affiliated under Act 11 of 1864. The abovementioned public Charitable Trust was created sometimes in January, 1909 and the constitution of the Management. Committee of the said Law College was formulated in 1928 under the said Deed of Trust by this Court in an Originaing summons proceedings (Suit No. 1064 of 1926) under section 92 of the Civil procedure Code. The scheme, which was made in that proceedings abovementioned was later on revised on September 29,1949 by an order of this court. Accounts of the said law college were being operated by the nominees of the Board of Trustees namely Cr. J. N. Mukherjee, Late J. N. Talukdar and late S. N. Ghoseh and after the death of Dr. J. N. Mukherjee, accounts were operated by Shri J. N. Talukdar and Shri S. N. Ghosh, Secretary of the Board of Trustees (for short the said Trustees hereafter ). After the death of Shri J. N. Talukdar in or about May 1987, in accordance with provisions for signatures of two trustees as are laid down For banking operations,. Resolution of the board of Trustees was passed authorising Shri Jashadeb Chaudhuri for joint operation of the Bank account of the said Law College. It was detected from the vouchers prepared and certified by the office of the College and sent together with the cheques to Shri Jashadeb Chaudhuri for his joint signature that the disbursements of the amounts certified by the Law College office were irregular. It further transpired that there were irregularities in the matter of cash collections, disbursements and the process of admission of students for sending them up for University examinations. It was, thereafter, decided that one member of the Trust office would examine accounts of daily collections of fees from the students and the same would be credited to the Bank. During the peak period in the month of Augusit/september, 1987, the above system of depositing the collections to the Bank was abruptly discarded by the erstwhile principal, who took over the charge of daily collections of the said law College for deposit with the Bank. Ultimately, it transpired that the erstwhile principal in collusion with the office staff and a group of unscrupulous and millitant type of students and ex-students resorted to the practice of clandestine removal of funds of the Law College, as would be evident from the fact that a sum of Rs. 96,000/- was found short. The Accountant and the Head clerk of the said Law College admitted in writing that the above sums were taken out by the said Ex-Principal, tout he did not make any deposit with the bank. In order to avoid such mal-practices, the Board of Trustees of the Law college by a resolution dated November 5 1987 decided to take back all books of accounts, papers, records and registeners to the office of the Trustees for audit verification. Such a step of the petitioners infuriated the office staff, including the erstwhile Principal, the Head Clerk and Cashier, who expressed their inability to produce account books ;and such other papers. As a result thereof, the petitioners were prevented from taking any papers from the said law College Office, by a group of students and other office staff. The Auditor, who was sent to the said Law College was. driven out of the College. Extreme form of vandalism and chaos prevailed and cotinued to prevail in the Law college. With a view to seize and take away some papers from the possession of the Trust Office at No. 34, Ballygunge Circular Road, some student leaders in collusion with office staff raided the Trust Ofice and caused serious damages to the properties of the Trust Office, including damage and destruction of the office records, books of accounts etc. The Police intervened by posting police pickets. Consequent upon the resignation of the then Principal in September 1987, Mr. M. C. Mukherjee, the then Vice-Chancellor's nominee was appointed as Principal of the said Law College. Even then, the regular classes in the 2nd and 3rd Year and admission to the 1st year Class were disrupted by the interference of the aforesaid millitant group, who declared that both admission and collection of fees would be controlled by them and no account of the collections would be rendered to the Trustees. However, the new principal of Law College, after much pursuasion, was allowed to join but the collection of fees amounting to Rs. 26,987. 50 p. for the period from November 30. 1987 was not deposited and kept at the said Law College for about four months nor the same was deposited in the Bank. It was further detected that the office staff committed various irregularities, viz. 1) without authority, a Capitation Fund was created for illegal collection from every students for admission, ii) Office staff collected university Examination Fees and drove outt the invigilators appointed by an order of A. K. Sengupta, J. Both the office staff and the students created a stalemate condition in the said law college and thereatened the Governing body that steps would be taken to move the Government for taking over the entire properties, and the assets. There were various court cases in the matter of such chaotic conditions prevailing in, the said Law College and in one of those cases, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, and B. C. Ray, JJ. passed an order of maintaining status quo. Thereafter, the Acting Professor-in-charge informed the Governing Body that the following irregularities were prevailing at that period. (1) No particulars of admission have been supplied to the Government and also to the Trustees. For the purpose of audit, the accounts were called for, but the erstwhile Principal complained that office was not co-operating, whereupon a Committee was set up in a meeting but on account of non-co-operation of the erstwhile Principal, othing could be done. (2) It further transpired that the students were sent up for L. L. B. Examination in collusion with the Controller of Examination with the help of some persons, who were not actual students of the said Law College nor did they pay the College Fees. The sanctioned strength of the College was for 960 students but the controller of Examination of the University issued over- 4000 forms and collected the Fees for issuing admit cards and results were published; but the governing Body or the Trustees were kept in the dark. Such action of the university or its officers is a clear manifestation of encroaching upon the rights of the petitioners. It further came to the notice of the Governing Body or the trustees that steps and counter-steps were taken by the Clerical staff' for stopping any enquiry into the matter by appointing an Administrator or Ad-hoc Committee, so that the entire irregularities could be shrouded in darkness. It further appears that by a resolution of the Syndicate, the university sought to appoint an Ad-hoc Committee to take over the control and management of the said Law College with view of ousting the legally constituted Governing Body. This is an instance of abuse of authority and colourable exercise of power without giving any notice whatsoever to the governing Body or the Trustees. Ira fact, no notice has been served upon the trustees or the Governing Body of the Law College in utter violation of the mandatory provisions of statute, 'ordinance and the provisions of Law. The petitioners challenged the supersession of the Governing Body and/or the board of Trustees of the said Law College and obtained C. R. No. 7246 (W) of 1979 and Injunction therein restraining the Respondents from interfering with their rights. Such move of the University to take over the management and control. of the said Law College amounted to willful disobedience and contumacious disregard of the said order. The petitioners claimed that the trustees and/or the Governing! Body of the said law college have the iundamental rights enshrined under Arts. 31, 31a (l) (b) proviso and 300a of the Constitution of India and the: resolution of Syndicated. April 26, '88 being violative of the provisions of Article 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution should be declared un-constitutional and ultraivires the Constitution. The stand of the respondents, as would appear from the affidavit-in-opposition, is presented hereunder ; on January 7, 1977. by a Resolution passed by the said University, the governing Body of the said Law College was superseded and an Administrator was appointed to take over the control and management of the said Law college. The said resolution of the syndicate was upheld by the trial court on being challenged by the Trustees on August30. 1978 in Appeal No. 395 of 1977 in the manner following : in course of hearing of the appeal we told Mr. Dey, the learned Counsel for the University, with the going into the merits of the respective contentions of the parties that an Administrator could be appointed under Ordinance, 64 only for a temporary period. The Administrator can continue in office until the governing Body of the College is re-constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Statutes under such directions as may be issued by the syndicate in this behalf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University would be at liberty to take such steps as it deems fit and proper in respect of the three Colleges In accordance with law. " as already stated, there were various litigations initiated at the instance of the contesting parties and ultimately by order dated June 11. 1979 in C. R. No. 7246fw) of 1979. this court passed ;an order restraining the Administrator from taking any step for the purpose; of constituting of reconstituting the governing Body or taking other steps. Thereafter, by a Resolution dated July 24, 1984, the University Syndicate resolved to appoint an Ad-hoc committee to take over charge of the said Law College from the Administrator inasmuch as the said Administrator wanted to be relieved from the office. Under the chairmanship of Dr. A. N. Mahmood, art Ad-hoc committee consisting of three educationists was formed. The said resolution dated July 24, 1984 was challenged and interim order was obtained. An appeal against the said order was preferred. During the pendency of the said appeal before G. N. Ray and P. K. Mukherjee. JJ. , the learned Counsels for the petitioners submitted that he does not intend to proceed with the writ petition. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of without there being any order on merits. Thereafter. Dr. A. W. Mahmood as Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee declined to take over the charge oft three College. On July 31,1986, the Under-graduate Council by its resolution modified the earlier decision dated July 24, 1984, whereby Prof. Anil Mukherjee was appointed as the Chairman of the Ad-hoc Committee. Against the said resolution dated July 31, 1986, a writ application was moved on August 6, 1986 as also the resolution of the syndicate, whereupon a status quo order was passed by U. C. Banerjee, J. Pursuant to decision of the Syndicate on the basis of its meeting held on august 19, 1985, it was resolved that Prof. Anil Basak would be made the chairman and Prof Anil Mukherjee and Prof. Parimal Kar would be two members of the said Ad-hoc committee by circulating the order of U. C. Banerjee, J. as aforesaid. Ultimately on November 25,1986, the court passed an order to the following effect: " Instead of the present. Administrator Shri Parimal Kar the administration of the College would be in the hands of an Ad-hoc committiee consisting of three persons, i. e. Mr. Ajit Roy Mukherjee as the Chairman of the said Ad-hoc committee besides two other Members, viz. Mr. Ajit Ghosh and shri Bishnupada Mukherjee, whose decision shall be final on all matters. . . . . . . . . . . . The present Administrator is directed to hand over charge to the Ad-hoc committee within a period! of two weeks from date. The present administrator is directed to hand over charge to the Ad-hoc committee within a period of two weeks from date. The present Administrator Is directed to take necessary steps for the purpose of payment of salary to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the college for the month of November 1985. In view of this order, the order or resolution passed by the Syndicate appointing an Ad-hoc committee is set aside and quashied. " against the aforesaid order of U. C. Banerjee, J. an appeal was preferred and the said appeal is pending and before such appeal was preferred, the board of Trustees also moved before this Court. The respondents claimed that the said Surendra Nath Law College was passing through serious mis-management and mal-administration for a long time. The students' Union by its representations made in December, 1987 and January, 1988, brought details of mal-administration and irregularities to the notice of the University, in particular the closure of the said Law College for an indefinite period with effect from December 29, 1987 and illegal admission of 5200 students in the current session against the approved strength of 480 students. Even candidates securing below 40% marks in their pre-qualifying stage have been admitted contrary to the standing-provisions of the Bar Council of India Rules. Considering the stalemate conditions, mal-administration and financial irregularities, an Enquiry Committee consisting of (1) Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. N. Roy (2) Mr. Biswanath Bajpayee (3) Prof. A. N. Dawn and (4) Inspector of colleges was formed. The Enquiry Committee submitted a report on April 7, 1988. The said report disclosed then prevailing conditions regarding mismanagement and financial irregularities. The said report further recorded the following points : - (i) Records not available, (ii) No elected Governing Body, (iii) Violation of University directives, (v) Violation of Admission Nonms, (vi) No trace of Students' Attendance Register, (vii) Absence of infra-structural facilities, (viii) Non payment of teaching and non-teaching staff, (ix) Admission of students stopped, (x) Various irregularities in the maintenance of finance. The said Enquiry Committee, inter alia, made the following recommendations : 1. To start admission to the 5-Year LL. B. Degree course as Bar Council of india Rules and also the norms as prescribed by the University. 2. To appoint whole-time teachers including a whole-time Principal. 3. To appoint non-teaching employees as; per the prescribed norms of the state Government. 4. To appoint a properly qualified Libration and to equip the Library properly. 5. To arrange for a thorough financial probe including the part played or actions taken by the Ex-Principal Shri S. N. Roy in the matter of admission of students in the LL. B. Classes. 6. To provide for students' amenities, namely, Common Room for boys and girls, ladies' toilet etc. Further objections raised by respondents is against (a) serious irregularities and mismanagement as regards financial matter, (b) wrongful and illegal acts committed at the instance of the Trustees in collusion with some interested parties. Respondents referred to and relied on sub-sections 10 and 11 of Sec. 4 of the Calcutta University Act, 1979 which reads thus : "4 ( 10): To take over for a period of 12 months the Management of any college or institution affiliated to. or recognised by the University other than a Government College or Institution, in order to ensure that proper standards of teaching, training or instructions are maintained therein; provided that the University may, if it considers it necessary so to do, extend such period so however that the aggregate period shall not exceed eighteen months. " "4 ( 11): To dissolve the: Governing Body of any affiliated constituent or professional college or institution, other than a Government College and pending reconstitution of the Governing Body In such manner as may be prescribed to appoint an Administrator or an Ad-hoc Governing Body; provided that the reconstitution of the Governing Body shall be made within a period of 12 months from the date of dissolution; provided further that the University may, if it considers it necessary so to do, extend such period so however that the aggregate period shall not. exceed eighteen months. " the said Law College, as pin-pointed by the Respondents, is passing through serious mismanagement and irregularities, mal-administration for a long period of time. The said Law College being affiliated to the University in terms of the Calcutta University First statutes, 1974 is required to observe the rules relating to affiliation of College and the relevant statutes, ordinance and regulations of the University in force for the time being, but the said Law college failed to do so. Further, the said Law College being a professional college and affiliated to the University has to maintain proper standard of teaching, training and instructions, but the said Law College developed a deadlock condition and all activities including teaching or imparting of instructions therein were stopped. The administration of the other surendranath Group of Colleges is run by Administrators or Ad-hoc committee since about 1977. The resolution of the syndicate and appointment of Ad-hoc committee taking over the management and control of the said Law college, does at in anyway, take away or interfere with any proprietory right of interest of the petitioners in respect of building premises, funds of thetrust. if any, furniture, fittings, books and Almirahs etc. and there is or was no move and attempt by the University to oust the so-called Governing Body of the trustees of the said College and the actions taken by the University are neither violative of the provisions of Articles 19 (l) (c) or Articles 300a or 31 of the constitution. The action taken by the University does not constitute any breach of rules of natural justice. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents claimed and contended that taking over the management and control of the said Law College does not constitute an abuse to the process of law and is not liable to be struck down. The actions taken by the respondents do not suffer from any infirmity. The plea of the petitioner has no factual foundation. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner after placing reliance on the fundamental grievances and the relevant statutes. Acts and Ordinances claimed and contended in the manner following : -The order of suppression is bad inasmuch as the Syndicate is not appropriate and proper authority to pass such an order in respect of Post-Graduate College. The Law College being a Post-Graduate College under the university Act, it is clear under the provisions of section 23 (l) (d) and 23 (2) (a) (l) (3) of the said Act that the Syndicate has no authority to supersede a Post-Graduate College like the Law College. The Syndicate is the Lowest body. The Syndicate's other power so far as the Post-Graduate College is concerned is only recommendatory in nature. Such an order as is warranted to be passed by the University under section 4 ( 10) and 4 ( 11) of 1979 Act is ultra virus the Constitution inasmuch as there is no assent of President as required under the provisions of Article 31a (l) (b) of the Constitution of India. The statutory powers are limited to four corners of the Act. Under the provisions of 1966act (since repealed), the Syndicate has the power to supersede, but the aforesaid provisions stand deleted under the provisions of section 1979 Act. The Syndicate has, therefore, no authority to supersede. Sub-section 10 of section 22 has also been amended and it is only applicable in Under-Graduate colleges but not to the Post-Graduate Colleges. Fundamental challenge made in the writ petition remains unanswered by the University. Affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Respondents was affirmed by the Deputy Registrar who, according to the petitioner, is not competent and empowered to sign and affirm the affidavit which authority vests with the Registrar only under the Statute. Statute 6 (7) (xi)reads thus : -" The Registrar shall sign papers in connection with all legal proceedings for and against the University. Delegation is not otherwise permissible. " the Vice-Ckancellor and the Controller and/or the Department of the said University have not filed any affidavit to controvert the various allegations made against them by the writ petitioners. Respondents, according to the Writ petitioiiefs proceeded to pass the ;aforesaid order without due observance of the Statutory requirement as laid down in the Act, Statutes, Regulations and ordinances. The writ petitioners also referred to the Opinion of the lawyer for the University as would appear from the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the deputy Registrar. . The said disclosure is as follows : " Now the Law Officer has also opined to take over the college in accordance with provisions of section 4 ( 1) and Ordinance 64, and , state that in the absence of the Faculty Council the Syndicate may consider the case. " there has been clear non-observance of the Mandatory requirement for the exercise of power. The University was to produce records, but such records were not produced before this court, certain papers were shown to the court, which do not answer the queries put forward by the court to the learned Counsel appearing for the University. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, in support of their contentions cited the following decisions of the Supreme Court: -1. Ballabadas Agarwalla us. J. C. Chakraborty (AIR 1960 sc 576)2. Ramchandra Keshav Akde vs. Govind Jyoti Chhabra (AIR 1975 SC 915)3. Gujarat Electricity Board vs. Girdharilal Motilal (AIR 1969 sc 269)4. Maneka Gandhi vs. Uniandn of India (AIR 1978 SC 597)5. State of Kerala vs. Very Rev. Mother Provincial (AIR 1970 sc 2079)6. Express Newpaper Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (AIR 1986 sc 872)7. C. S. Rowjee Vs. A. P. Slate Transport Corporation. 1964 (6)SCR 350 ). 8. K. L. Shephard vs. Union of India 1987 (4) SCC 431 9. Mahinder Singh Gill Vs Chief Election Commissioner (AIR 1978 SC 851)10. Nazir Ahmed vs. The Kindemperor (63 Indian Appeals at p. 372)11. Bangalore Water Supply Vs A. Rajappa (AIR 1978 SC 548)In Maxwell oflnterpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) the law has been analysed as follows : " A strong line of distinction may be drawn between cases where the prescriptions of the Act affect the performance of a duty and where they relate to a privilege or power. Where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations formalities or conditions shall be complied with it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a arigorous obseoxmce of them as essential in the acquisition of the right of authority conferred, and it is, therefore, probable that such was the intention of the legislature" (emphasis added ). The Supreme Court in the case of Ballabhadas Agarwalla (supra)held " We are, therefore, of the view that in the absence of a fresh order of delegation of which there is no evidence in the record, the Health Officer of the howrah Municipality was not empowered as the duty delegated authority to institute criminal proceedigs against the appellant on the date on which he made the complaint. " in the case of Ramcharidra Keshau Aced (supra) the Supreme Court held n the manner following : -" Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way. the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This Rule squarely applies where the whole time and object of the Legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition to do it in any other manner. " the learned Judges in Gujrat Electricity Supply Board (supra) held : -" Section 6 (1) confers power on the State Electricity Board to take away the property of the; licensee. Such a power must be exercised strictly in accordance with the law. The legislature, has prescribed the manner of its exercise. It must exercise in that manner and in no other way. It must also be seen that the parliament deliberately changed the form of the notice to be given from what it was before Act 32 of 1959 was enacted. It prescribed that the notice must specifically call upon the licensee to sell the undertaking. The mandate of the law is clear and it must be obeyed. That being so, we must hold that sec. 6 (1) is mandatory and it must be strictly complied with. " the decision of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed (supra) case where the judicial Committee held : -" The rule that where a power is given to do certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way to the exclusion of all other modes of performance or not at all. " the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra)case summed up the position as follows -" Although there is no positive words in the statute requiring that the parties shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature. The principle of audi alterem partem which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is part of the rules of natural justice. " the Supreme Court in the case of Express Newspaper Pvt. Lid. (supra) decided that "where malafide are raised it is necessary that person against whom such allegations are made should come forward with answer refuting or denying such allegations. Or otherwise, such allegations remain unrebutted and the court in such a case be constrained to accept that the allegations remaining unrebutted answer the (test of probability. " in the case of C S. Rowjee (supra) the Supreme Court lays down the law as follows: -" The next question is as referred to the inference to be drawn from this fact which in the absence of their denial has to be taken as true. There had been no denial, by the Chief Minister nor any affidavit of any person who claim or can claim personally about the truth of the allegations. The Secretaries of the Home Department have affirmed the counter affidavit in which the allegations set out earlier have been formally denied. The learned Advocate General did not suggest that he could act upon such second hand denial by the Chief Minister as the statement by Mr. S. A. Iyenger is merely his hearsay. We, therefore, are constrained to hold that the allegations that the Chief Minister was motivated by bias and personal dealing against the appellant stand rebutted. " the decision of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in State of kerala (supra) held in the manner followsing : -" Sec. 63 (1) involves the transfer of right to possession of the properties to the University. This section provides for compulsory requisition of the properties within art. 31 (2) and (2a ). To be effective, the section required the assent of the President under clause (3) and it was not obtained. Therefore, the saving in Art. 32-A (l) (b) is not available. " decision in the case of Mahinder Singh Gill (supra) is as follows : -" It was argued, based on rulings relating to natural justice, that unless civil consequences ensured, hearing was not necessary. A civil right being adversely affected is a sine qua non for the invocation of the audi alteretern partem rule. This submission was supported by observation in Ram Gopal 1970 (ISCR) 472. Of course, we agree that if only spiritual censure is the penalty temporal laws may not take cognisance of such consequences since human law operates in the material field although its vitality vicariously depends on its morality. But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves,,by passing verbal boo by-traps ? 'civil' consequences undoubtedly cover in fraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivation and non -. pecuniany damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. " observation of the Supreme Court in K. L. Shephard (supra) are as follows : -"fair play is a part of the policy and is a guarantee for justice to citizens. In our system of Rule of law every social agency, conferred with power is required to act fairly so that social action would be just and there would be furtherance of well-being of citizens. The rules of natural justice have content thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the level of civilisation and Rule of law prevailing in the community. " let us now examine the other rival contentions of the parties. At the material time the said college being a post-graduate college under the university Act, power of the Syndicate can at best be treated as recommendatory in nature. An order of superssession is required to be passed by the University under section 4 (10) and 4 (11) of the said Act and none else. In view of the repeal of the 1966 Act, the residuary power of the Syndicate stands entirely withdrawn consequent upon deletion of sub-sections is 2 and 3 of the sections 22 and 23. Under the; present law, the Syndicate has no power whatsoever to supersede Governing Body of a Post-Graduate college as has been done in instant case. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the syndicate has power to supersede, the said power has to be exercised in strictest conformity with the Rules, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations. It was incumbent upon the University to secure the due compliance with section 4 ( 10) of the said Act, which was not done in the instant case. The Respondents did not issue any show cause notice to the management or the Governing Body of the said college nor the petitioners were given any reasonable opportunity of hearing in the matter. The petitioners were not given opportunity of showing cause as to why such supersession has become essential and there has been clearest breach of fundamentals of fair play in action and violation of the principles of natural justice. Respondents did not observe audi alteram partem principles. The period of supersession under section 4 (1)and 4 (11) of 1979 Act has already expired and it cannot be: extended. Temporary taking over the management under sctions 4 (10)and 4 (11 ). of the 1979 Act cannot be extended. On the question of exercise of power, the contention of the petitioners that the strict and vigorous fulfilment of the conditions precedent is essential. In my view it is to be considered from the perspective of acquisition of right. Despite ample opportunity given to the university to produce the records, the University authorities did not produce the records. Temporary taking over of the said law College under section 4 (10)and 4 (11) of the 1979 act constitutes violation of the provisions of article 19 (1) (g) and 31a ( l) (b)of the Constitution of India inasmuch as the assent of the President, which is required to be obtained has not been obtained. No assent of the President was obtained. Assent of the President is mandatory. The learned Judges of the supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala (supra) held in the manner following : "assent of the President is mandatory and was not obtained and therefore, saving under Article 31a (l) (b) was not available. " reliance on the decision of Maneka Gandhi (supra) squarely applies in the present case. After Maneka Gandhi's case, I am of the view that a notice calling upon the trustees of the Law College to show cause ought to have been given and the Trustees should have been heard before the order or resolution impugned in the writ application was passed. Undoubtedly, the order impugned in the writ application affecting the right of the petitioners involves civil consequences. Civil consequences undoubtedly cover breach of infraction of not merely property, or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In a comprehensive sense, everything that affects a citizen in the civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Therefore, the plea of the respondents that no prior notice nor any opportunity of hearing is required cannot be sustained. Reference may be made to the decision of Mahinder Singh Gill (supra ). The stand of the petitioners that the deputy Registrar is not competent to sign title affidavit under the provisions of the University statute which gives power only to the Registrar who is the only competent authority to answer the allegations in connection with all legal proceedings for the University is of some importance inasmuch as section 6 (7) (xi) of the University Act clearly lays down that it is the Registrar only who can sign the affidavit for and on behalf of the University and none else. The deputy Registrar who affirmed the affidavit has no locus standi nor any power to do so on behalf of the University. Reference in this respect has been made to the case of Express Newspaper Pvt. Ltd. (supra ). Denial by a person against whom allegations are made is required to tie properly made and the Deputy registrar's denial who has no knowledge in the matter cannot be accepted as correct version of the case. The allegations of collusion, conspiracy and malafide as mentioned in para 17 (b)of the Writ petition had neither been controverted nor denied by the said Deputy Registrar that the Controller of the university has no time to verify and or check the Admission Cards/forms. In the circumstances, the court cannot but hold that the Deputy Registrar of the university though allegedly empowered to file affidavit is not competent to answer the allegations where questions of malafide and collusion of the university authoroties in relation to facts which formed the basis of supersession are concerned. The said facts were not to the personal knowledge of the Deputy Registrar. The University authorities in the facts of the case should have come forward to controvert the allegations. Since the University or the Controller did not file any affidavit, the court should necessarily come to the conclusion that charges off malafide and collusion stand established apart from the question of authority' of the Deputy registrar as stated above to file any affidavit on behalf of the University. The basic assertion of malafide and vindictiveness remains unchallenged. The Deputy registrar, in my view, is not the authorised person for swearing any affidavit and/or filing papers in connection with legal matters. In the circumstances aforesaid I am unable to pursuade myself to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents that the University authorities have dealt with all assertions of facts of the petitioners by properly denying the same. The action of the University authorities in effecting the supersession as impugned in the writ application is to be examined from the angle of fairness. The authorities concerned should not be misguided for extraneous and irrelevant consideration. Fairness is a fundamental principle to ensure that the statutory authority while arriving at a decision shall act with a sense of responsibility in dealing with the case. Essence of fairness equally applies to administrative authority. The facts and circumstances in the instant case present a clearest departure from the fundamentals of fairness. Exercise of power by the University was neither properly effected nor the University authority acted fairly while dealing with the matter of supersession of the governing Body of the said Law College and taking over the management and control of the said Law College. Exercise of Power by the university was without informing and taking into confidence the petitioners whose rights are seriously affected. Under the circumstances it is apparent that the University authorities acted is unseemly haste in passing the order of supersession and taking over control and management of the said Law College. In my view,, this court cannot bur hold that the University authorities acted arbitrarily and improperly to curtain and rights of the petitioners. If any decision detrimental to the rights of person is taken, such decision is liable to interference. The University authorities did not act fairly and their action cannot be said to be legal and valid. Right of the petitioners cannot be taken away in a clearest breach of fairplay in action. The period of supersession having long expired, the university cannot any further hold the. management and control of the aforesaid Law College to the exclusion of the Trustees. This, in my opinion, is not in conformity with the express provisions of the university Statute or the ordinance. The University should follow its own rules and in no circumstances it can act without observance of audi alterem partem principles if such extension of supersession is otherwise warranted in law. The Court can also examine whether such statutory power has been used properly or improperly. A clear analysis of this aspect can be called up from the celebrated treatise on 'administrative Law by Prof. H. W. R. Wade, 5th End. The importance of the House of Lord's decision was underlined by lord Denning M. R. 'the discretion of a statutory body is never unfettered. It is discretion which is to be exercised according to law. That means at least this: the statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not by irrelevant ones. If its decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith : nevertheless the decision will be set aside. That is established by Padfield vs. Minister of agricultre, Fisheries and Food, which is a landnmark in modem administrative law. " the court should be oblivious of the well-settled principle that defined procedure which binds the statutory authorities must be scrupulously obseived. This rule, also emanates from Article 14 of the Constitution and it does not rest merely, on that Article. It has; independent existence in administrative law, which has been evolved as a check and curb upon exercise of arbitrary power by the Executive. Every action of the University must be informed with reasons and should be free from arbitrariness. The authorities concerned are required to act fairly and also in a rational manner. That was not done in the facts of the case. One other important fact is that the University never produced the relevant records. Already I have made a Reference to maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (supra), which clarifies the position. Admittedly, taking over of the college under Sections 4 (10) and 4 (11) of the Act constitutes serious inrod and infringement of the right conferred under Article 191) (g)in particular Article 31 (1) (b ). Assent of the President as indicated above is essential. Assent of the President has not been obtained. The Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply vs. Rajappa (supra) overruled the decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 1873. The learned judge of the Supreme Court held in the manner following : -" In our conclusion is that the University of Delhi (AIR 1968 SC 1873) case was wrongly decided and that education can be and is in its institutional form an. industry. " and in coming to the above conclusion the Court summarised its reasons in the following terms : 'the final ground accepted by this Court is a mission and vocation, rather than a profession or trade or business. The most that one can say is that this is an assertion which does not prove itself. Indeed, all life is a mission and a man without misson is spiritually still-born. The high mission of life is the manifestation of the divinity already in man. The christian education as mission even if true is not to negate its being an industry. We have to look at educational activity from the angle of the Act, and so viewed the ingredients of education are fulfilled. Education is, therefore, an industry and nothing can stand in the way of that conclusion. " in that result, I set aside all the impugned proceedings including the order of supersession. Trustees shall be restored to power ad control of the said law College forthwith. Ad-hoc committee approved by the university shall cease to hold management and control of the said law college. While setting aside the order, it is imperative that certain directions must be given. Trustees shall appoint M/s. Price Water House, a reputed firm of Chartered Accountants for auditing the accounts during the period the Adhoc committee and/or the Administrators continued. If upon such audit it is found that sum of Rs. 2 lakhs or any amount has been defalcated from the college fund belonging to the Trustees during the management of the said Law college by the Ad-hoc Committee, the University shall reimburse the defalcated amount. Similarly, in the matter of debts and liabilities incurred by the incurred by the Ad-hoc committee appointed by the University, the same shall be properly investigated by the said Auditors to find out whether the trustees of the said college are at alt involved or concerned with such debts or liabilities The Trustees and the University authorities will be at liberty to act on the basis of the report of the Auditor. The University authorities will also be at liberty to take suitable action before the appropriate forum in respect of loss and damages If any suffered by the college. The Trustees shall also hold an enquiry through the Auditors to be appointed in terms of this order regarding the conduct of the Ex-Principal who is said to have mis-appropn huge amount belonging to the College fund. It is stated that the Ad-hoc committee and/or Administrators has appointed several full time teaching and non-teaching staff contrary to the prescribed rules and terms of their appointment. The Trustees will form committee to enquire into the legality of the appointments, if any, made take appropriate action on the basis of the findings of such Committee according to law. The University authorities are, therefore, directed to implement the order passed by this court today forthwith, preferablly within three days from the date of communication of this order. Be it recorded that the matter was kept reserved for judgment, which has been appearing in the list for a number of months so that all the relevant records can be produced. No one is present when the matter is called on for judgment. The court cannot keep the matter pending any longer. Accordingly, the judgment is delivered today. It has been brought to the notice of the court that during the pendency of the writ petition the petitioner no. 1 has died. In his absence, the cause of action survives to the other petitioners. Let the name of the petitioner no. 1 be deleted from the cause title of the petition. The writ application thus succeeds and is hereby allowed. There will be no order as to costs.