HARADHAN PAL Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These four petitions under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 226 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of habeas corpus are taken up for consideration. The three miscellaneous cases Nos. 6, 19 and 20 of 1971 were filed by respective detenu who were detained under orders of the District Magistrate in the district of Hooghly (Case No. 6) and within the district of Burdwan (Cases Nos. 19 and 20). They are all served with orders of detention and they were detained in jail. The Petitioners allege that they have been wrongly and improperly detained under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Prevention of Violent Activities Act, 1970 (President's Act XIX of 1970) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It has been alleged that the ground of detention served on the detenu are illegal and irrelevant and not in terms of Section 3(2) of the Act. It is further alleged that the grounds of detention served under Section 8(1) of the Act are not only vague but they also afford no opportunity for making an effective representation to the State Government. It is also alleged that the grounds are not only not relevant under Section 3(2) of the Act but they are also malicious, untrue and false. It is, accordingly, prayed that the order of detention be set aside and the writ in the nature of habeas corpus be issued directing the release of the Petitioners in each of the three cases.

(2.) Mr. Balai Chandra Ray, learned Advocate for the Petitioners in cases Nos. 6, 19 and 20 of 1971, has challenged the order of detention on several grounds which may be considered under two broad heads: (a) Objections relating to the interpretation of the Act; (b) Objections relating to the application of the Act. We propose to consider these objections separately under each of the two heads.

(3.) As regards the objection relating to the interpretation of the statute, Mr. Ray has contended in the first place that though the word 'satisfaction' in Section 3 of the Act means the subjective satisfaction of the authority, yet in view of Section 3(2) of the present Act the subjective satisfaction has been limited or guided by objective criteria as laid down in the various Sub-clause (a) to (e) of Section 3(2) of the Act. In the second place, it has been argued that the subjective satisfaction under the present Act must be expressed in the order of detention for the twin purposes, namely, 'security of the State' and 'public order' and not for either of them. In the third place, it has been argued that in each of the grounds supplied under Section 8 of the Act the detaining authority must record separately the relevancy of each of the grounds to one or other prejudicial acts categorized in each of the sub-clauses, viz. (a) to (e) of Section 3(2) of the Act.