SARDAR JASWANT SINGH Vs. BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this application we are concerned with the affairs of the Khalsa High School which is situated at 73, Paddapukur Road in the city of Calcutta, the affairs thereof are in the hands of a Managing Committee and it is not disputed that such affairs are subjected to and governed by, the provisions of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1950. In the application, numerous facts have been stated, condemning the administration of the School by the Managing Committee and particularly the conduct of the respondent No. 3, Sri G.S. Grewal, who has been described as the Vice-President of the Managing Committee, in my opinion, however, it is not necessary to go into any such facts. The scope of this application lies in a very small compass and is as follows: The petitioner was employed as an Assistant Teacher in the said School, and at the relevant time the respondent No. 3 was the Vice-President of the Managing Committee. On or about the 3rd August, 1959 the said Vice-President informed the petitioner that he had absented himself from School and his explanation was unconvincing and false, and his services were suspended with effect from 13-7-59 in the interest of the School. Upto now, the petitioner has remained suspended. It is against this order that this application is directed.

(2.) The point taken is that under Rule 33 of the Revised School Code, it is the Managing Committee alone which can suspend a teacher, and that the Vice-President of the School, although a member of the Managing Committee, cannot by himself make such an order. Rule 33 of the Revised School Code runs as follows;

(3.) That the order of suspension dated 3-8-1959 was made by the Vice-President and not by the Managing Committee is not disputed. What happened, however, was that subsequently a resolution was passed by the Managing Committee confirming all the actions of the Vice-President. It is argued that this resolution is not valid because it was not in the agenda and no specific mention was made in the resolution regarding this particular order of suspension. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter presently. Mr. Ray appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 3 to 10 has taken two preliminary points. The first point taken is that the Managing Committee of this private school was not a "public body" and the respondent No. 3 was not a "public officer" discharging public duties or statutory duties. Hence, it is not permissible to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus. The second point taken is that in any event the Revised School Code is not a statutory provision of law. Therefore, a writ in the nature of mandamus does not lie to enforce the same. In Sohanlal v. Union of India, Imam J., said as follows: