RAKHALDAS MUKHERJEE Vs. S P GHOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a rule upon the respondent, the Second Additional Rent Controller, Calcutta, directing him to show cause why his orders dated February 23, 1950, and March 22, 1950, as mentioned in the rule, should not be set aside and/or why a writ of certiorari should not issue for quashing the same. As the application, with regard to the last named order has been abandoned, I am only concerned with the order dated February 23, 1950.

(2.) The facts are shortly as follows: Premises Nos. 116A and 118A, Mechua Bazar Street, were requisitioned by the Government for a 'public purpose'. The petitioner describes himself as the 'Secretary of the Calcutta Sub-Committee of the Khulna District Congress Committee', and Secretary, 'Khulna Nibas' Boarding Establishment', and he says that me Government made over the premises to him for the purppses of starting educational institutions, residential boarding house for (evacuees and for affording accommodation facilities to displaced business men from East Bengal. It appears that in a portion of the house there is a school, and in another portion, a boarding house under the name and style of 'Khulna Nibas. It is also alleged that rooms are let out on rent and in a part of the house, there is a dispensary. Several inmates of the house made applications before the Rent Controller, some for fixing fair rate of their lodgings as lodgers under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act 1948, and others for fixation of fair rent as tenants. The tenants also made applications for repairs. The Rent Controller (the respondent) dealt with these applications, and as regards the first group, they have already been the subject-matter of an application under Article 226 before me. The present rule relates to eight applications made by three persons who claim to be tenants, for fixation of rent) and repairs. The names of the tenants are Harendranath Datta (Case No. 2755 C and 2758 C of 1949), Paresh Kanti Sarkar (Case Nos. 2760 C and 2761 C and 2756 C and 2757 C of 1949), and Krishna Gopal Kundu (Case Nos. 2754 C and 2759 C of 1949). A boarder called Parimal Mazumdar made an application for fixation of standard rent (Case No. 59 C of 1950). So far as Case No. 59 C of 1950 is concerned, it is admitted that Parimal Majumdar was a boarder and therefore his case is governed by the rule that has already been disposed of by me previously. I am now concerned with the order in respect of the three tenants who had instituted the eight cases above named, all of which eight cases were disposed of by the respondent, by one order dated the 23rd February, 1950. By that order, the Rent Controller fixed the standard rent and gave certain directions for repair. If the applicants were tenants, it is not disputed that the Rent Controller was quite competent to fix the standard rent and order repairs to be carried out. It is however, alleged that the applicants were not tenants but boarders and/or lodgers of the boarding house called 'Khulna Nibas'. It is equally not disputed by the respondent that if they are in fact not tenants but lodgers, the respondent had no right to fix the standard rent or; order any repairs to be carried out. Therefore, the only dispute is as to the question of fact, namely, whether the three applicants before the. Rent Controller are 'tenants' or 'lodgers'. The matter, has been dealt with by the respondent in his order dated 23rd February 1950 as follows:

(3.) It is therefore clear that the Rent Controller came to a clear finding that the applicants in the eight cases lived in a portion which was quite distinct and separate from the Boarding House. It is argued on behalf of the applicant that this finding was based entirely without evidence. It appears form the certified copy of the recorded evidence in these] eight cases that there is nothing in the depositions recorded which bear on this point. It was however stated on behalf of the respondents that there was evidence placed before the Rent Controller on this point. When the application was first made before me, I suggested that in order to close all controversy, I should be prepared to hear this issue upon evidence, namely, as to whether the three applicants are, tenants or lodgers; the respondent and the said three persons upon whom the rule was served and who are appearing before me, readily agreed to that course. The applicant, however, after obtaining an adjournment for considering the matter, has declined to go into evidence.