DHAJADHARI CHATTERJEE Vs. NITYA NANDA ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a Rule against an order of a Judge of the Small Cause Court Calcutta, refusing an application purporting to be one under Section 18(1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act, 1950, as subsequently amended for rescinding a decree for possession.

(2.) THE Original Order was passed on March 25, 1950, by consent in a proceeding in which the only defualt alleged under the Act of 1948 was one under Section 12(3) of the Act, usually referred to as an ipso -facto defualt. On May, 20, after Act XVII of 1950 came into force, the tenant made an application under Section 18(1) of that Act for relief. That was granted, although objection was taken by the landlord that the decree was a consent decree. On revision by this court, it was pointed out that the case was clearly one of ipso -facto default, and, in view of the interpretation put on Section 18(1) at that time, it had no application to such cases. Therefore, in revision this court set aside the order of the. learned Judge which had rescinded the original order of March 25, 1950. By the order of this Court the date of delivery of possession was extended till November 1.

(3.) STRICTLY speaking, the tenant could not make any application under Section 18(1) as such. Section 18(1) even as amended requires that application be made within 60 days of the coming into (force of Act XVII of 1950, that is to say, of March 31, 1950. The only section under which the tenant could conceivably apply is Section 6 of Act LXII of 1950. Unfortunately although one may presume that it was intended by this Section to give relief in a case such as the present, it fails to do. It runs as follows: 'Where at any time between the commencement of the said Act (XVII of 1950) and of this Act an order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises has been made..............' an application may be made within 60 days of the commencement of Act LXII of 1950 and the order or decree may be rescinded. Section 6 cannot apply to the present case because the order in question for recovery of possession was made on March 25, 1950, not in the interval specified in Section 6.