MRIGAN MAITY Vs. DARIDRA BANDHAB BHANDAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Several years after the horse has bolted, the state government appeals to the inherent sense of justice of the court by wielding the parens pateriae doctrine to both chase the horse back into the stable and bolt the door. The primary application, GA No. 3637 of 2010, is the one carried under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by the State for recalling orders dated October 8, 2004 and December 23, 2004 by which the suit stood disposed of. GA No. 3490 of 2007 is a previous application by the State seeking leave to take over the assets and liabilities of the seven hospitals that belong to the first defendant. GA No. 643 of 2011 is by the added defendant seeking a clarification of the recent orders made on the States principal application and, in effect, seeking to continue in management of the hospitals as permitted by the orders passed in the year 2004. GA No. 2766 of 2011 is by a person claiming to be an erstwhile employee of one of the hospitals and a member of the first defendant society.

(2.) As is almost inevitable in a matter of the present nature, a question of the locus standi of the state government to maintain its prayers has been raised. The real tussle is between the state government and the added defendant, Picasona Health Care Private Limited. The plaintiffs have not been represented in course of the present proceedings despite service. The existence of the first defendant society is in serious doubt and though some persons claiming to be the members of the first defendant society have either used an affidavit or have applied to be heard, they appear to be unabashed supporters of added defendant Picasona and have hardly made any bones about it.

(3.) Before embarking on the question of the States locus to apply and have the orders passed in the year 2004 recalled, the scope of the suit and the orders made therein must be noticed without comment. In the plaint relating to the suit, the third plaintiff is claimed to be a registered trade union; the first plaintiff is said to be the general secretary of such union; and, the second plaintiff is described as the chief adviser to the third plaintiff union. The avowed purpose of the suit, as evident from the opening paragraph of the plaint, is to enable (members of the third defendant union) to recover the dues from the defendant no. 1. The second defendant is described as the special officer appointed in respect of the said Society by this Honble Court by an order dated September 29, 2000 The plaint says that in 1992 the employees of the first defendant society instituted proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and, by an order dated December 23, 1996, this court directed payment of the salaries to the employees of the relevant hospitals within a particular time. The plaint reveals that on a subsequent writ petition a similar order was made on January 28, 2002. The business end of the plaint and the reliefs claimed therein need to be seen in the plaintiffs words: 8. However, the defendants have not paid the salaries 1.12.99 to 30.4.2002 and other dues of the workmen of the said hospitals. Full particulars of such dues are as follows:- P A R T I C U L A R S 1. On account of salaries of the staffs and Employees Rs. 85,00,000.00 2. On account of Provident funds Rs. 65,25,363.00 3. On account of Gratuities and other benefits Rs. 55,00,000.00