SUJAN KUMAR UKIL Vs. UNION OF INDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The confusion arose in view of the lack of transparency in the process of issuance of circulars by the Railway. As per 1961 circular, the Clerk (Grade-I), who had passed Appendix II-A. Examination would be entitled to three increments with a minimum of Rs. 150/-. The Railway Board issued a further circular in 1968 extending the benefit to the persons working as Clerk (Grade- II) by giving them three increments after passing of the said examination. However, that particular increment would be given in a scale of Rs. 110-180 as specifically mentioned in the circular. The dispute arose when the Railway attempted to withdraw the benefit through circular dated October 30, 1981, that too, with retrospective effect from January 1, 1973 on the recommendation of Third Pay Commission. Pertinent to note, the Railway did not clarify the position that such increment was possibly taken note of by the Third Pay Commission while revising their pay. A batch of employees approached the Tribunal vide T.A. No. 148 of 1988 (C.R. 1867-w/75). The Tribunal categorically held that such circular could not have any retrospective effect. The Railway became unsuccessful before the Apex Court while challenging the order of the Tribunal. The issue attained finality. The Railway issued a further circular on January 23, 1996, clause 5 (3) being relevant is quoted below:

(2.) Being aggrieved by the said circular dated January 23, 1996, the present petitioners approached the Tribunal. The petitioners contended before the Tribunal that they passed out the relevant examination in January 17, 1981, they could have been considered for promotion in Clerk (Grade-I) contemporaneously. The authority, however, delayed the process of promotion. They got their promotion in June, 1981 onwards. Hence the cut off date could not be applied to them. The Tribunal did not find favour with the argument advanced by the petitioners. The Tribunal observed that the application was bereft of any merit and as such dismissed the same. The Tribunal while considering the issue observed, merely because the earlier application was allowed that reached finality before the Apex Court, would not and cannot mean that the applicants would be entitled to benefit of the said orders despite the fact that the Apex Court observed that benefit of such Scheme had been discontinued from 1981.

(3.) Being aggrieved, the petitioners approached us by filing the instant application in 2005. The said application was kept pending for long for the reasons best known to the petitioners. The matter has now come up before us for being heard on merits.