DHRUBA PADA GHOSH Vs. BANK OF BAROADA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal directed against the order passed by a learned single Judge of this Court dated February 3, 1992, whereby the learned single Judge directed the petitioner to make a fresh appeal detailing all his grievances as taken by him before the Appellate Authority and the direction has been given that the Appellate Authority shall hear the petitioner and pass a reasoned order on merits, and it was directed that the decision is to be taken within three months from the date of communication of this order and he set aside the order of the Appellate Authority. Aggrieved against this order dated February 3, 1992 of the learned single Judge the present appeal has been filed by the appellant/petitioner.

(2.) BRIEF facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are: The petitioner was appointed as a 'Cash Clerk' in the Bank of Baroda and was posted at his office at 8, India Exchange Place, Calcutta -1, while working as a Cash Clerk he was directed by the Regional Manager to perform the duties of Head Cashier, Category 'C' in the Bank's Lake Market Branch in addition to his normal duties of a Cash Clerk. Petitioner was given a special pay of Rs. 172/ - per month. Petitioner was provided keys relating to strong room and Cash Safe, namely the keys of the Right Drawer and Left Drawer of the Cash Safe bearing Numbers B1 SP 10490, S 10895/2, B1 35077, R 11103 and L 11052 respectively. It is also alleged that there are duplicate keys which are being kept at Bank's Bhawanipore Branch and whenever it is necessary these duplicate keys are brought from Bhawanipore Branch. It is alleged that on April 16, 1985 due to some personal business petitioner went to office after schedule time and he found that duplicate keys of the Iron Safe, Strong Room etc. were brought from the Bhawanipore Branch on the signature of the Accountant and the Head Cashier who was on duty before the arrival of the petitioner. Thereafter on April 23, 1985 petitioner received a letter from the respondent No. 4 asking him to submit an explanation for alleged shortage of cash on April 18, 1985. Petitioner informed the respondent that there was no such shortage. Thereafter on May 6, 1985 petitioner was placed under suspension for contemplating enquiry on account of shortage of cash worth Rs. 1,00,000/ - on April 18, 1985, Petitioner was served with the charge -sheet for misappropriation of the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/ -. Thereafter inquiry was conducted. Ultimately the Enquiry Officer submitted a Report and found the petitioner grossly negligent in performing his duties and it was further found that he tampered with Bank's record, committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank and it is unbecoming of an employee. Thereafter petitioner was given a show -cause notice and ultimately the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of dismissal against the petitioner. Petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority affirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. Aggrieved against this order the appellant -petitioner filed writ petition before this Court. The learned single Judge after considering the matter remitted (sic) this case back to the Appellate Authority for reconsideration of the matter and to pass a reasoned order in accordance with law. Aggrieved against the order passed by the learned single Judge the present appeal has been preferred.

(3.) IN this connection learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Ors., reported in : (1979)IILLJ217SC , wherein it has been observed that when a procedure has been laid down by the authority then the authority must be rigorously held to its standards by which it professes its action to be judged. In the present case this case has no relevance for the simple reason that the procedure as laid down in the Bipartite Settlement it is nowhere required that the Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the Enquiry Officer is required to give a detailed reason. According to that procedure what is, required is that after the report of the Enquiry Officer has been received finding the delinquent guilty if the disciplinary authority agrees with the finding then under Clause 19.12 an opportunity of hearing should be given to the delinquent with regard to the nature of the proposed punishment on account of charges being established against him. Therefore this judgment has no relevance. Similarly our attention was also invited to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dr. Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab and Ors., reported in : (1975)ILLJ228SC . In this case also it was observed that whenever such administrative instructions are issued though they do not have force of law but the State Government on its own could not depart from that without rational ustification. In this case as we have already mentioned above there is no such procedure by which it is laid down that the Disciplinary Authority is required to pass a speaking order when the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. Similar view has been taken in the case of Sukhdev Singh and Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Anr., reported in : (1975)ILLJ399SC . Therefore these judgments are of no help.