SATYA NARAYAN MONDAL Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the order dated 23rd Feb., 2001 refusing an application under section 15 (2) (b) of the West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, in a proceedings under section 13 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, has been challenged.

(2.) The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the interpretation sought to be given in the impugned order with regard to the applicability of section 15 (2) (b) of the West Bengal Amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, is altogether a narrow interpretation. According to him, a proceeding under section 33-A (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is to be decided in the same manner as an Industrial disputes is decided. Though it is not said in so many words in section 33-A but it is clear from section 33-A of the said Act, where it has been provided that such a proceedings shall be treated to be a dispute referred to it and be decided accordingly. Therefore, the proceedings under section 33 (2-)'(b) is also a dispute within the meaning as contemplated in section 15 (2) (b). It is by reason of the deeming clause having regard to the contention of the scheme of the Act the proceedings under section 33 (2) (b) shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute attracting the application of section 15 (2) (b). According to him, the scheme of the Statute cannot be read out of context. It has to be read having regard to the entire scheme of the Statue. If a firm view is taken of section 33 and reconciled with the provisions of section 33-A, in that event, it will appear that even a proceeding under section 33 (2) (b) is a dispute within the meaning of section 15 (2) (b) of the said Act. He further contended that there cannot be any differentiation between an Industrial dispute as defined in section 2(k) with a dispute within the meaning of section 2-A. Therefore, section 15 (2) (b) can also be applied in a reference relating to an individual workman without being espoused by the Union which is within the meaning of section 2-A. Therefore, the impugned order should be quashed.

(3.) The learned Counsel for the employer respondent, on the other hand, contends that unless it is a dispute referred to under section 10 (1) of the said Act, section 15 (2) (b) has no manner of application. In the present case, until the approval is given under section 33 (2) (b), there is no dismissal and in such event, section 2-A cannot be said to have come into existence for the present purpose. Therefore, without any disputes there is no scope of section 15 (2) (b). As seen it will be referred to under section 10 (1) read with section 2-A, this question might crop up but at the present stage, such question does not arise.