(1.) Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of the vagueness in the order of reference, the matter could not be adjudicated upon by the 8th Industrial Tribunal. Subsequently, it was transferred to the 4th Industrial Tribunal. According to him, the notification dated March 11, 1997 could not be construed to mean the 4th Industrial Tribunal nor the 8th Industrial Tribunal. In order to substantiate his contention, he referred to annexures to this petition at pages 60 and 61 respectively of this Writ Petition. From the said annexures, he points out that the reference is made to a particular Tribunal and such Tribunal was to pass its award within the time stipulated. Whereas in the impugned order of reference, no particular Tribunal has been mentioned in the order of reference. Therefore, the vagueness is apparent on the face of it. According to him, it will be an infraction of substantive law, which cannot be overlooked and corrected. He has relied on the decision in Bennett Coleman and Company Limited v. State of Punjab and Others, reported in 1995 - III - LLJ (Suppl)-426 (P&H) to contend that in such case, both the Tribunals will lose jurisdiction. According to him, under Section 10(l)(d) the Appropriate Government is to exercise this power, while referring to a particular Industrial Tribunal. Section 33-B of the Industrial Disputes Act prescribes that it is only the Appropriate Government, which can transfer. Therefore the transfer, made by the 8th Industrial Tribunal, is void and by reason of the decision cited and the position in law, both the 8th and 4th Industrial Tribunal had lost jurisdiction.
(2.) Even if it is accepted that by the said notification dated March 11,1997, reference was made to more than one Tribunal, in that event, in one part of the order of reference, the 4th Industrial Tribunal would not have been mentioned. If in the order of reference the particular of the Tribunal was altogether absent and was not mentioned anywhere in the order, in that event, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner could be said to be of substance. In one place, it might have been omitted even if it is at the place where the order of reference is made; but still then when it is indicated immediately thereafter that it is to the 4th Industrial Tribunal, in terms of sub-section, (2-A) of Section 10, while prescribing the time limit, in that event, the reference was made particularly to the 4th Industrial Tribunal. Inadvertent omission to mention 4th Industrial Tribunal at the third paragraph will be too a technical ground. Therefore, on this ground it cannot be said that the order of reference is so vague that the 4th Industrial Tribunal has lost its jurisdiction.
(3.) So far sub-section (2-A) of Section 10 is concerned, it prescribes that time limit is to be stipulated in the order of reference. Under Section 10, when a reference is made, it is made to a particular Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the name of the Tribunal, in the order of reference. In view of sub-section (2-A) of Section 10, the time, within which the Tribunal has to pass its award, is required to be indicated in the order of reference. Therefore, the order of reference must contain the name of the Tribunal, and the period, within which such Tribunal is to pass the award. In the present case, while the reference is made under Section 10(l)(d), the name of the Tribunal appears to be missing. But, in the immediately following part of the same order of reference, where time is stipulated under sub-section (2-A), the 4th Industrial Tribunal is required to submit its award within the time stipulated. Thus, a reading of the order of reference indicates that the reference was made to the 4th Industrial Tribunal. Otherwise, the 4th Industrial Tribunal would not have been required to submit its award with the time stipulated. Since the reference was intended to be made to the 4th Industrial Tribunal, therefore, the 4th Industrial Tribunal was required to submit its award within the time stipulated in the order of reference.