GEETA DAS Vs. RAJABALA KUNDU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge, VIIIth Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 691 of 1978. The suit was filed by the respondent against Smt. Maya Mitra, the mother of the present appellant for her eviction from the disputed premises on the ground of default in the matter of payment of rent and reasonable requirement for the respondent and the members of her family. It appears that the said defendant filed petitions under Sections 17(1) and 17(2a)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. An order was made on 16.5.83 assessing the arrears of rent from November 1977 to April 1983 at Rs. 1,095/- inclusive of interest and the defendant was directed to pay of the same in monthly instalments of Rs. 45 starting from June 1983. The defendant was also directed to go on depositing a sum of Rs. 15 being equivalent to the rate of rent month after month regularly within the statutory period. The defendant also filed his written statement. She, however, did not deposit any amount in compliance with the aforementioned order. The respondent filed an application under Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act which was allowed and the aforementioned defendant's defence against the delivery of possession was struck out. The suit was subsequently decreed ex-parte and the ex-parte decree was subsequently set aside. It appears that the original defendant died during the pendency of the suit and her daughter, the sole heir and legal representative was substituted in her place. She also filed a written statement which was accepted. She, the present appellant filed a petition under Order 39 Rule 7 of Civil Procedure Code for a local inspection of the disputed premises. On the date on which this petition came up for hearing the learned Judge observing that no useful purpose would be served by allowing the petition for local inspection since the defendant's defence against delivery of possession had already been struck out rejected the petition and then proceeded to take evidence of the parties on the point of the service and sufficiency of the notice under Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Finding both the points in favour of the respondent the learned Judge decreed the suit. Hence the appeal.

(2.) IT is urged from the side of the appellant that the learned Judge made a mistake by decreeing the suit on the ground of service and sufficiency of the notice alone without coming to a definite conclusion that the respondent was entitled to a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In support of his contention the learned Advocate for the appellant cites Ferozi Lal v. Manmal, AIR 1970 SC 794 : 1970 RCR 375, Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC 838, Roshan Lal v. Madan Lal, AIR 1975 SC 2130, Moharem Ali v. Dinanath, AIR 1973 Cal. 379, Modula India v. Kamakshya De, AIR 1989 SC 162 : 1988(2) RCR 530, Smt. Naibahu v. Lala Ramnarayan, AIR 1978 SC 22 : 1978(1) RCR 211. The learned Advocate also argues that no decree on the ground of default in the matter of payment of rent could be passed on the finding made in the course of the disposal of petitions under the various provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In support of his argument the learned Advocate also cites Aloke Ghosh v. Inspector General, where it was observed that a finding on an application under Section 17(1) of the Act will be made prima facie and for the purpose of the said proceeding.

(3.) TRUE in the short order which has been passed by the learned Judge it is mentioned that the suit was one for ejectment of a premises tenant on the ground of default in the matter of payment of rent and also reasonable requirement. It is also recorded that the plaintiff had made out her case. But from the tenor of the order it becomes quite clear that the learned Judge was inclined to decree the suit being led solely by the consideration that the defence against delivery of possession had already been struck out. There is no clear cut finding anywhere in the order that the respondent had made out her case on the ground of default or reasonable requirement. It becomes difficult to support the impugned order as such.