(1.) This is a suit by the plaintiff against the defendant for loss of goods due to misdelivery and/or nondelivery of the same by the Eastern Railway. It is alleged in the plaint that the goods were loaded at Dutta Pukur to be delivered to the consignee, Sub-Divisional Officer (P.W.D.), Mal Construction Sub-Division, under RR No. A 116018 dated 28-6-64. The claim in the suit is for decree for Rs. 14428.80 and for other reliefs. In the written statement filed in the suit, the defendant, while denying the allegations in the plaint, took a preliminary point in paragraph 15 thereof that in view of the provisions in amended Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act 1890, this Court should not and could not entertain the suit inasmuch as the goods were delivered at a place and its destination were both outside the jurisdiction of this court.
(2.) When the suit was called on for hearing, it was submitted that the question of jurisdiction should be decided first as a preliminary issue.
(3.) The allegation in the plaint is that the head office of the Eastern Railway Administration is situate at No. 17 Netaji Subhas Road, and as such the defendant carries on business within the jurisdiction of this court. These allegations are not denied in the written statement. Reading the plaint as a whole, it appears clearly, that the jurisdiction of this court has been invoked on the basis of the defendants' carrying on business within the jurisdiction and not on the basis of cause of action in the suit. The defendants' counsel, however, took the preliminary point that after amendment of Section 80 of Indian Railways Act by Indian Railways (Amendment) Act of 1961, the suit for compensation of this nature could be filed only where cause of action arose as provided in the amended Section 80. According to him the present Section 30 overrules by implication Section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure and Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. He strongly relied on Section 4 (1) Civil Procedure Code and Clause 44 of the Letters Patent in support of his contention that Indian Railways Act, 1890 being a special and local law in force, the same would prevail over the provisions of Section 20. Civil Procedure Code or Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. In this connection, he also relied on 74 Cal LJ 416: (AIR 1942 Cal 229) (Sitaram Bhattacharjee v. Pancha Muchi). There the question was whether a Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide about the existence of a "debt" between two parties to a Civil Suit when this dispute between the parties was pending for decision before the Debt Settlement Board, who, under the amended Section 20, Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act, had exclusive jurisdiction to decide that matter. On a reference under Order 46, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, it was decided that Civil Court should not exercise concurrent jurisdiction in a matter which had been relegated to the Debt Settlement Board. The defendant's counsel also relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Jagannath Chetram v. Union of India delivered on 19-4-79. There the plaintiff had delivered goods to Western Railway Administration at Surat to be delivered to the consignee at Shalimar through South Eastern Railway Administration. The suit was instituted in this court because the Eastern Railway Administration has its head quarter within jurisdiction although Eastern Railway Administration had nothing to do with the transaction. It was held, that, in a suit for compensation, the liability would be of that particular Railway Administration who had taken delivery of the goods for carrying the same to the destination or the Railway Administration where the destination is situate. Therefore, the Union of India could be sued in Courts within whose jurisdiction the head quarters of these two Railway Administrations are situate. For the purpose of fixing liability for loss or damage of goods, the different Railway Administrations are treated as distinct units and the Union of India can be sued where the head quarters of that particular units liable for the loss or damage is situate. As Eastern Railway had nothing to do with the transaction in suit, it was held that this court was not competent to entertain the suit. This judgment, therefore, proceeded on the basis that a suit for compensation for loss of goods against Railway can be instituted in a Court on the basis of defendants' carrying on business within the jurisdiction and not on the basis of cause of action only as urged by the counsel for the defendant.