LATIKA SARMA SARKAR Vs. UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application reveals an unfortunate state of affairs in the sphere of administration of education. The petitioner who appeared in the M.A, Examination in Political Science for the year 1968 challenges the action of University based on the decision of a Review Committee. It is necessary to set out the facts shortly relevant for the purpose of this application. The petitioner appeared as mentioned hereinbefore in the M.A. Examination in January, 1969. On the 31st of May, 1969 results were declared by the Board of Examiners in their meeting. On the 2nd of June, 1969 results were published. It has been contended on behalf of the University that the said publication was provisional. By the said results published the petitioner secured first class marks having obtained a total marks of 480. It was necessary for her to obtain 480 marks in order to be able to get a first class. It has been stated that thereafter the University received representation which contained the allegations about the conduct of the said examination. It had been alleged that certain teacher examiner had coached privately certain students and there were unfair appointments of examiners and distributions of examination papers. On 18th of July, 1969 the Syndicate had approved the proceedings of the council relating to the publication of the aforesaid result. On the 19th of July, 1969, the petitioner received a letter dated 12th of July, 1969 from the Controller of Examinations, University of Calcutta, intimating that the results in the said subject already published and mark-sheets issued to the petitioner were provisional pending enquiry by the Review Committee which might be set up under Section 32 of Chapter V of the First Regulation, 1966. On the 29th of July, 1969 the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued notification setting up an enquiry committee. The enquiry committee arranged to send all the scripts of the said examination for revaluation to the examiners outside West Bengal. On 16th January, 1970 the enquiry committee submitted its report to the Vice-Chancellor which was considered by the Post-Graduate Council at its meeting on 30th January, 1970. The enquiry committee noticed what has been described as an intriguing feature of the results, namely ten candidates were placed in the First Class while 73% had failed. On the 30th of January, 1970 after submission of the findings of the said enquiry committee, the Council of Post-Graduate Studies of Arts re-opened the matter in so far as the unsuccessful candidates were concerned by recommending that in cases of those candidates only they should be given the pass marks as a result of the review and referred this matter to the Board of Examiners for fresh decision. At a meeting on the 11th of March, 1970 the Council of Post-Graduate Studies in Arts referred the matter to the Vice-Chancellor. On 18th March. 1970 the Vice-Chancellor appointed a Review Committee to review the results of the candidates. Thereafter, on the basis of the Review Committee's recommendations revised results were published and under the said results the petitioner was able to secure only total marks of 476. She thereby lost her position of being in the first class. Being aggrieved by the said decision the petitioner has moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

(2.) The short question with which I am concerned in this application is whether the Vice-chancellor had the power to appoint a Review Committee. Secondly, it is necessary to consider whether the appointment of the Review Committee in the facts and circumstances of the case was proper and thirdly to consider whether the procedure adopted by the Review Committee was in accordance with law. It was contended that after the results were published and after certificates had been given to the petitioner it was not permissible for the University to revise or review the said results without any specific allegation of malpractice against the petitioner and without having proceeded against the petitioner personally in respect of those allegations. It was contended in effect that certificates once granted were final and could not be interfered with. I am, however, unable to accept the position. It appears to me that under the scheme of the Calcutta University Act, 1966 the Regulations framed thereunder and the conventions that have been so long followed, until the conferment of the Degrees and Diplomas and the Certificates at the Annual Convocation the publication of the results must be considered to be provisional. Section 140 of the Calcutta University First Statutes. 1966, provides that the degrees of the University should be conferred at the Convocation of the University. My attention was drawn to a decision of A. N. Ray J., in the case of Kazi Khurshid v. Assistant Controller, (1964) 68 Cal WN 403, wherein it was held that there was no legal right to require the holding of an emergent or special meeting for conferment of degree on the students who had passed the required examinations but did not attend the Convocation. It was further held that the conferment of degree was a matter regulated by Rules and Regulations of the University. In that case the petitioner prayed for granting of original diploma to the petitioner, as he was unable to proceed to the United States of America for Post-Graduate Studies without the original diploma. It was held that the petitioner in that case was not entitled to the said prayer. Even though the publication of the result and the granting of certificate are provisional it has to be considered whether the University has power to interfere with the result provisionally published in the manner it has purported to do in this case. For this purpose it would be relevant to refer to certain statutory provisions. There is no clear definition of what is the meaning of the expression "University of Calcutta". In the definition clause of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, Section 2(20) only says the University is University of Calcutta as constituted under the said Act. Section 3 provides that the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the members of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council shall constitute the University of Calcutta. Section 4 deals with the powers of the University including the powers to do all acts and things necessary, desirable and incidental for the purposes of the University. Section 6 provides who shall be the officers of the University. Section 9 deals with the powers and duties of the Vice-Chancellor. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 states that the Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal executive and academic officer of the University and shall perform certain specified functions. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 enjoins the Vice-Chancellor to ensure that the provisions of the Act and Statutes and Ordinances are faithfully observed and to take necessary action for such observance. Sub-section (6) of Section 9 is relevant for the present purpose and it is necessary to set it out:

(3.) It is not necessary for me to see whether the exercise of the power in this case by the Vice-Chancellor was properly made or not. As a matter of fact it was not argued that there was no emergency, but prima facie, it appears to me that there was an emergency because the results could not be held up for long and the decision by the University Senate or the Syndicate would have delayed matters and held up the publication of the final results. It is also not the case here that the Vice-Chancellor had exercised the power mala fide or for ulterior purpose. Prima facie, it appears to me that the exercise of the power by the Vice-Chancellor was made bona fide and on a correct situation. My attention was drawn to a decision of D. Basu, J. In the case of Adwaitya Kr. Matty v. President, W. B. Board of Secondary Education, (1967) 71 Cal WN 396 where the Court was concerned with the construction of the emergency powers given under similar provision under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963. Similar is the case on which reliance was placed on Bidyut Kr. Biswas v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (1969) 73 Cal WN 417. In the view I have taken it is not necessary for me to discuss these cases in detail.