(1.) THE petitioners in the two Revision cases (No. 1599 of 1959 and No. 1 of 1960) have been committed to take their trial to the Court of Session at Alipore. The petitioner Sudhir Kumar Bhattacharjee has been charged on two counts under section 465/471 and petitioner Monmatha Nath Haldar under section 467 of the Indian Penal Code. They have moved this Court under section 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for an order quashing the commitments.
(2.) THE matter arises in this way: One Bibhuti Bhusan Majumdar instituted proceedings before the Thika Controller at Alipore for eviction of the petitioner Sudhir Bhattacharjee. The proceedings had a leisurely career and eventually terminated in an order of eviction made on the 30th of November, 1954. In December, 1955 an application was made by Bibhuti asking for a complaint to be made against these petitioners for having fabricated false evidence, namely, certain rent receipts and used them as genuine. On this application a complaint was directed to be made, but before any complaint was actually made, an appeal was taken which was, however, dismissed. Thereafter on the 16th of December, 1958 a formal complaint was made by the Thika Controller and addressed to the Police Magistrate at Alipore. It was alleged that a prima facie case under sections 193, 196, 465 of the Indian Penal Code had been made out against the petitioners. On receipt of the complaint cognizance was taken and proceedings were commenced before the Magistrate who held a preliminary enquiry under Chapter XVIII of the Code.
(3.) AT one stage of the argument before us it was doubted whether section 195/476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at all applied to these proceedings. Quite obviously the Thika Controller made the complaint in pursuance of the provision contained in section 195 read with section 476 of the Code. Section 195 (1) (c) imposes a bar only if the offences mentioned in that clause have been committed by a party to a proceeding in any court. The question, therefore, arose whether the Thika Controller was a court within the meaning of the section. That question is not altogether res Integra. In the case of Rai Harendranath Choudhuri v. Sm. Daulatmani Chaudhurani (1) (62 C. W. N. 143) it was held that the District Judge exercising powers under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, was a Court. It was observed "in view of the fact that the District Judge is required to determine the dispute finally upon a presentation of their respective cases by the parties, that he is required to decide question upon evidence, that he is empowered to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and compel production of documents in the name manner as is provided for by the Civil Procedure Code and in view of the fact that the order made by him may be executed in the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code for the execution of decree and lastly that the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Cede for the trial of suits is to apply as nearly as may be, to the determination of appeals presented before him, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the District Judge is a Court. ".