IN RE: KANJI ABDUL RASUL Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for the issue of succession certificate with regard to certain moneys of the deceased in banks in Calcutta and Bombay. I had granted the application. Before the certificate was actually issued, the learned Registrar-in-Insolvency very properly drew my attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court, which seemed to throw doubt on the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the certificate. I had the matter then again placed on the list for further arguments. I had at that time requested Mr. Subimal Roy, a member of the bar, to assist me in the matter and Mr. Roy very kindly agreed to do so. This Court is deeply obliged to Mr. Roy for his able assistance. Having had the benefit of hearing Mr. Roy, my doubts have been resolved and I accordingly confirm the order that I previously made.

(2.) The difficulty arose in this way. The petition shows that the deceased had at the time of his death his ordinary residence at Rangoon and that he had died on January 27, 1947, that is after the separation of Burma from India. He was, therefore, a non-resident foreigner. In Mir Ibrahim Alikhan v. Ziaulnissa Ladli Begam Saheb,1887 12 ILR(Bom) 150, Weston J. said about Section 3 of Act XXVII of 1860 that it did not make provision for the administration of the effects of a foreigner domiciled abroad. Section 3 of this Act corresponds to Section 371 of the Indian Succession Act, which has taken the former's place. Weston J. also said that the former Act seemed to him to contemplate the issue of a certificate under it only to the estate of a British subject, either resident within the district where a certificate is sought, or else having no fixed place of residence. He further stated that representation to the estate of a non-resident foreigner could properly be sought in a country he belonged to and the constituted representative could then sue in the British courts. This is the judgment which created the difficulty in the mind of the learned Registrar-in-Insolvency.

(3.) It is quite clear that the observations of Weston J. were entirely obiter dicta. It is equally clear that his observations that the representative of a foreigner could take out representation in the foreign State in which the foreigner resided and then sue in this country on the strength of it is wrong. The law on the point may be quoted from Cheshire on Private International Law (3rd Ed), p. 674: