DOLPHIN AGENCIES PVT LTD Vs. LGW LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The two suits are almost identical save the identity of the defendants. The defendant in either case has applied for rejection of the plaint on the primary ground that the respective suit is barred by law. It is submitted on behalf of the two defendants that a judgment on the one matter would govern the other. The documents referred to in this judgment are those found in CS No. 65 of 2009.

(2.) The plaintiff states that the defendant is entitled to duty credits calculated as a percentage of the FOB value of its exports of raw cotton. The plaintiff claims that the defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to transfer the duty credit licences that it was to obtain in favour of the plaintiff at a price of 60 per cent of the value of the licences. Such agreement, according to the plaintiff, would be evident from the defendants letter of January 10, 2009 which was erroneously marked as January 10, 2008. The plaintiff says that by a government notification of February 17, 2009, exporters of cotton became entitled to VKUY duty credit scrips for exports made after April 1, 2008. The plaintiff has complained of the breach of the agreement evident from the defendants letter of February 11, 2009 seeking to repudiate the contract. The plaintiff has alleged that the duty credit scrips are not ordinary articles of commerce and that they are of special value and interest to the plaintiff and not easily available in the market. The usual averments are all in place in the plaint before the following reliefs are claimed:

(3.) The defendant asserts that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief at all. The defendant insists that the document bearing the date January 10, 2008 was, indeed, issued on such date and reflects only a standing offer. The defendant contends that even if the plaintiff had accepted such offer there would be no binding contract. The defendant submits that despite the last sentence of its letter of January 10, 2008, no offer or contract of the present kind is irrevocable notwithstanding the offer or contract recording its irrevocable nature. The letter of January 10, 2008 is short and contains the terms that the plaintiff seeks to specifically enforce: