NAMITA GOLDAR Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In the present case, son of the second wife of the deceased employee claimed appointment on compassionate ground and the respondents railway authorities rejected the said claim on the ground that the appointment on compassionate ground to the second wife or her children can not be considered in view of the specific circular issued by the Railway Board on 2nd January, 1992.

(2.) It is not in dispute that the deceased employee married for the second time during the lifetime of the first wife as there was no issue from the first marriage. Undisputedly, the employee concerned died in harness, leaving behind two wives and four children of the second wife. Admittedly, the first wife never challenged the second marriage of the deceased employee, nor even any complaint was lodged by the said first wife before the railway authorities for taking any disciplinary action against the deceased employee. The deceased employee used to live with both the wives and the children of the second wife. From the records we also find that the second wife and her children got their respective share of retiral benefits of the deceased employee and furthermore, the said second wife is also getting her share of family pension regularly. Therefore, when the second wife has been accepted as a member of the family of the deceased employee and the railway authorities granted family pension to the second wife treating her as a member of the family of the deceased employee, there cannot be any valid reason to deny the claim of compassionate appointment of the son of the said second wife specially on the ground that the said son cannot be treated as a member of the family of the deceased employee being the son of the second wife.

(3.) The Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2000 2 SCC 431 specifically held that the second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage may be illegal but the children born out of such second marriage are legitimate and are also entitled to the estate of the father. Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid judgment is set out hereunder: