(1.) This is an appeal directed against the order passed by the learned single Judge in a Writ Petition No. 1555 of 1999 dated December 6, 1999 filed by the petitioner Madan Mohan Ghosh. The learned single Judge set aside the order of the 1st Industrial Tribunal's whereby the Tribunal permitted Mr. Amar Roy, an advocate, the President of the Employers' Association to represent the employer company before the Tribunal.
(2.) The petitioner workman raised an Industrial Dispute with regard to his illegal termination by the employer and accordingly the matter was referred, to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication by appropriate Government. The petitioner was represented by Sri S. N. Roy Chowdhury, General Secretary, Motor Workers' Union of which the petitioner was a member. An objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner against the representation of legal practitioner Sri Amar Roy to conduct the case on behalf of the respondent/company. Petitioner workman filed an application for calling some documents with regard to the existence of the Association and the representation being made by Mr. Amar Roy. It was contended that Mr. Amar Roy was neither any officer of the Company nor any member of this Association. Therefore, he cannot represent the Company. The application was rejected by the learned Judge, 1 st Tribunal by his order dated October 11, 1999 and permitted Mr. Amar Roy to represent the employers before Tribunal. Therefore, aggrieved by the order the petitioner/workman filed the present writ petition.
(3.) The learned single Judge after reviewing the whole matter came to the conclusion that Sri Amar Roy cannot be permitted to represent the Employers' Association because of sub-section (3) of Section 36 as Sri Roy is a lawyer and he is neither a member of the Company nor the officer of the Employers' Association. Therefore, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and accordingly set aside the order of the Tribunal. Aggrieved against the order passed by the learned single Judge present mandamus appeal has been preferred by the employer. We have heard the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record. The whole controversy centres round the interpretation of Section 36(1) & (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as Act).