(1.) In these three review petitions, we are called upon to review our common judgment dtd. 13/12/2017 passed by us in WP(C) No. 350 of 2016, WP(C) No. 360 of 2016 and WP(C) No. 361 of 2016 holding that the writ petitions were not maintainable due to the existence of an alternative appellate remedy provided for by law.
(2.) We heard both Dr. A.K. Saraf, the learned senior counsel for the review petitioners, and Mr. P. Datta, the learned counsel for the Revenue, at some length. We have duly noted the submission of the learned counsel for the Revenue that the review petitions are devoid of merit as there is no error committed by this Court which can be said to be apparent on the face of record, and the petitions are merely a ruse to by-pass the appellate authority constituted by law. It is argued by Dr. A.K. Saraf, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, that this Court, while dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of their non-maintainability, ought to have issued direction to the CESTAT that if an appeal was filed under Sec. 35-B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Tribunal should decide the appeal on merit without going into the question of limitation. No statutory provision is pointed out to us by the learned senior counsel obliging us to issue such direction. On the contrary, should there be any delay, it is for the appellate authority to condone the delay in presenting the appeal in time in accordance with law, if and when an application to that effect is filed by the petitioners; this Court cannot usurp the jurisdiction conferred upon the appellate forum by Parliament. The learned senior counsel also contends that this Court ought to have directed the CESTAT to admit the appeal without insisting on pre-deposit for entertaining the appeal inasmuch as the original order dtd. 31/5/2012 passed by the respondent No. 2 was challenged by the applicant before the CESTAT and when the CESTAT passed an order insisting on pre-deposit of 10% of the disputed amount for entertaining the appeal, the applicant approached this Court, which thereafter directed the CESTAT to consider the appeal without insisting on pre-deposit. In our considered view, this cannot also be a ground for review as we cannot pass any direction contrary to Sec. 35-F of the Central Excise Act; to do so would amount to violation of a statutory provision, which is impermissible. Sec. 35-F of the Central Excise Act is in the following terms:
(3.) The other contention of the learned senior counsel that since the writ petitions were dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, this Court ought to have directed continuance of the interim order till the appeal was considered by CESTAT, is noted only to be summarily rejected for the simple reason that once the appeal has been dismissed, no interim order could be passed by this Court, after all, interim order can be operative only during the continuance of the main case. The law is now well-settled that no interim order can survived independently of the main case; once the main case is dismissed, the interim order should also die a natural death. It is for the appellate forum to grant interim order is filed as warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case if and when an appeal is filed thereat.