UTTAM CHAND Vs. PURUSHOTTAMDAS JI PATEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a second appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. Arguments on the question of admission heard.

(2.) IT has been held by the first appellate Court after reversal of the decree of the trial Court that the suit accommodation is not required bonafide by the plaintiff No. 2 for the purpose of starting the business "in general goods" of his son Lalchand (P. W. 2) and he has reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city for this purpose. It is an admitted fact that during the pendency of the appeal the plaintiffs have got actual possession of an accommodation just behind the shop from which the defendant is sought to be evicted. That alternative accommodation in possession of the plaintiffs consists of two big halls and two rooms. There are two openings on the main road from that accommodation. The width of those openings is less than the width of the shop in possession of the defendant. In the original plaint the plaintiffs did not disclose the nature of the business which Lalchand (P. W. 2) wanted to carry on in the suit accommodation. At the time of the evidence it was specifically stated by Lalchand (P. W. 2) that he wants to carry on the business "in general goods". He had further clarified in cross-examination that he wants to carry on the whole-sale business in tea leaves and sugar in the suit accommodation. After remand of the case Lalchand (P. W. 2) shifted his stand and came forward with the plea that he wants to carry on retail business. He is intelligent enough to realise that the accommodation which has now become available is suitable for carrying on whole-sale business in tea leaves and sugar. Therefore, now he is pressing for his need to carry on the retail business. The suit accommodation is facing the main road and therefore he wants to show that this would be more suitable for the retail shop.

(3.) THE first appellate Court has dealt with the entire documentary and oral evidence on record and after its proper appreciation and threadbare discussion has held that the alternative accommodation available with the plaintiffs is reasonably suitable for the business which Lalchand (P. W. 2) wants to carry on. There is no perversity in the approach of the first appellate Court. The finding which has been arrived at is just and reasonable. Therefore, no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal.