SARJU PRASAD PATEL Vs. NANAKCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a defendant's second appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. . The following substantial question of law was formulated by the order dated 22-7-1993 at the time of admission of the appeal :

(2.) THE facts relevant for the decision of the question referred above are that the defendant is tenant of the plaintiffs for the last 35 years at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- on the ground floor of the house. The plaintiffs are in occupation of the first floor. Kailash Srivastava was also the tenant of the plaintiffs in this house. He was having one room on the first floor, one room on the ground floor and some other accommodation. The plaintiffs filed a suit for eviction against him on the ground provided in Section 12 (1) (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 stating therein that the accommodation was required by them for the residence of the members of the family. That suit was decreed. The plaintiffs got possession of that accommodation but it was let out to Khemchand. All this is borne out from the evidence of plaintiff Nanakchand (P. W. 1) in his cross-examination. He was specifically asked as to why he let out that accommodation and did not occupy it for the residence of his family members. The only explanation which he gave was that he wanted to reconstruct that portion but he had no means to do so and therefore, he has let it out at a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- to Khemchand. This is not a satisfactory explanation. He does not say that the said portion was not reasonably suitable for the members of his family. As a matter of fact that was more convenient as one of the rooms of that accommodation was on the first floor just adjacent to the accommodation already in possession of the plaintiffs. This circumstance is very material and strikes at the bonafides of the plaintiffs. This circumstance was not at all taken into account by the trial Court and the first appellate Court brushed it aside without any cogent reason. The accommodation in possession of the defendant is not more than what Kailash Srivastava had vacated.

(3.) IN S. S. Gupta v. M. C. Gupta, AIR 1999 S. C. 2507 (October issue) after reviewing the entire case law of this Court and of the Supreme Court it has been held that the degree of intensity contemplated by the word "requires" is much more higher than in a mere desire. That should be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The need should be natural, real, sincere and honest. It has been further observed that the availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i. e. , an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere and natural.