PRAMILA DATTATRAYA DEHANKAR Vs. KESHAVRAO LAXMANRAO DIGHIRESKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22 -10 -1997, passed by the Eighth Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, in Civil Appeal No. 54 of 1997, affirming the judgment and decree dated 24 -10 -1996 passed by the Sixth Civil Judge, Class -II, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 147A of 1996. The judgment and decree passed in this appeal shall govern the disposal of second appeal No. 975 of 1998, because it is based on common questions of the facts and law. The appellants executed a sale -deed dated 12 -4 -1972 in favour of the respondent No. 1, who is their son -in -law. The property covered by the sale -deed consisted of a house and compound wall as detailed in the schedule attached with the plaint. The appellants claimed that the aforesaid sale -deed dated 12 -4 -1972 was merely a nominal sale -deed purportedly executed with view to avoiding the possible impact of the law of ceiling on urban properties projected to be passed in future by the legislature according to talks in the political circles. Since the nominal sale -deed was without consideration executed with the desire to defeat the projected law, the appellants did not part with possession of the suit property in favour of the respondent No. 1. No attempt was made by the respondent No. 1 to get his name mutated in his favour in respect of the suit property described in the schedule -A in the plaint. The original sale -deed was retained by the appellants and even after the execution of the sale -deed the appellants exercised their rights of ownership by selling two plots marked by letters and in the Schedule -B of the plaint. They claimed that the rest of the plot marked by letters belonged to the appellants and accordingly it be declared that the appellants are the owners of that property. It was claimed by the appellants that the purpose of filing of the suit was that now that they want to be recognised as owners of the suit property. The respondent No. 1 admitted the claim of the appellants. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that it was of collusive nature and was filed with a purpose avoiding the stamp duty involved in executing a deed of reconveyance. The appellants preferred an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellants and the respondent No. 1 filed a compromise application, praying that a decree as prayed for by the appellants be passed. The Lower Appellate Court confirmed the finding of trial that the suit was collusive and was filed with a view to avoid stamp duty. In doing so, it held:

(2.) BOTH the appeals are having finally disposed of by this common judgment as the parties agreed that the case be finally decided after hearing the arguments. During the course of arguments it appeared to this Court that trial Court had applied the principles of estoppel and certain other points arose on which the Appellate Court did not base its conclusion. However the question is so much mixed up that it would be safe to frame the following question No. 4 which would also meet the reasoning of the Lower Appellate Court. (4) Whether the suit was liable to be dismissed on any of the principles estoppel or on the ground that the appellant was required to claim further relief or because the property was worth more than Rs. 100/ -. Before embarking upon the exercise of answering the other questions, it would be convenient to decide the question No. 4 first.

(3.) HOWEVER the general rule permitting the Court to grant decree on compromise or admission or consent is relaxed when the Court sees in it the makings of a collusion. The admission of compromise is not entered into simply for resolving in the differences between the parties, but for giving some secret advantage, which may not appear on the face of admission or compromise. The purpose may be ulterior or even sinister. Here the agreement for admission or compromise gives out different picture than it purports to be. A collusion is a secret agreement between the parties to the agreement to do a thing to get an object which may not be otherwise obtainable by way of straight forward legal means. In collusion compromise consent or admission there is a meeting of minds. To that extent they are similar. But the purpose of compromise consent or admission may be to obtain straight forward result of settling the disputes; Whereas collusion takes up a sinister path of gaining advantage in an oblique way. The ulterior motive is to get some thing which is prohibited by the law in the garb of apparently legal agreement. A careful lifting of the legal apparel and a look beneath may reveal the sinister motive of getting the 'forbidden fruit'. In short collusion is also a compromise with a rider that its purpose is oblique or sinister. 13A. The question that props is: Why are the Courts chary of passing a decree or order when it appears to them that the parties are 'colluding'? The answer to such a question may be in the fact that Courts are meant to do genuine justice to parties and cannot be used for a purpose which appears to them to lend an opposite colour to their decrees or orders. In other words the Courts cannot permit the parties to stultify themselves and thereby pollute the fountain of justice. The section 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that an object of an agreement would not be deemed to lawful (i) It is forbidden by law or made with the purpose to defeat any process of the law. (ii) If it is fraudulent, (iii) Or it involves injuries to person or property of another, (iv) Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy.