SARDAR MACHHI SINGH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this writ petition, the petitioner had prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order dated September 7, 1999 (annexure P-7), and further to issue a writ of mandamus against respondent No. 1, Commissioner of Income-tax, to accept the declaration made under Section 88(1) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998. It is averred in the writ petition that the petitioner made a declaration on December 31, 1998, under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957.

(2.) THE Commissioner of Income-tax, by order dated February 23, 1999, accepted the declaration and intimated the petitioner as contemplated under Section 90(1) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. Under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, the said authority determined the tax payable by the petitioner at Rs. 51,640. THE petitioner was directed to make payment of the said amount within 30 days from the date of the certificate. THE petitioner deposited the amount by three challans on March 27, 1999. An intimation to the effect was sent on March 29, 1999. THE Commissioner, by order dated September 7, 1999, rejected the declaration on the ground that the petitioner had made the payment on March 27, 1999, which was beyond the stipulated time which expired on March 25, 1999. It is stated in the writ petition that the amount has to be paid within 30 days from the date of communication of the order passed by the Commissioner and, therefore, the application was within time. It is also stated in the petition that if the date of passing of the order is accepted to be the relevant date, the petitioner could have deposited the amount on March 25, 1999, but that was a bank holiday and the amount was deposited on March 27, 1999. THErefore, there was one day's delay in making the payment and it would have been appropriate on the part of the Commissioner to condone the delay.

(3.) THOUGH Shri Nema initially contended that the limitation has to be computed from the date of communication of the order, and not from the date of passing of the order, he did not pursue the said point and chose to confine his contention with regard to the argument that one day's delay which should have been condoned by respondent No. 1.