LAWS(MPH)-1999-10-14

R P TIWARI Vs. SOLUCHNA CHOUDHARY

Decided On October 28, 1999
R.P.TIWARI Appellant
V/S
SOLUCHNA CHOUDHARY Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is defendant's second appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. . The substantial questions of law which were formulated at the time of admission of this appeal by the order dated 13-9-1995, are as under :-

(2.) THERE are concurrent findings of fact of the trial Court and the first appellate Court that the defendant was tenant of Mukund Das in the suit accommodation house No. 738 block No. 12, Wright Town (Narsinghdas Building), Jabalpur, at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/- since 1956. He was paying rent to Mukund Das. The plaintiff has purchased this house from Mukund Das by registered sale-deed dated 23-10-1973 (Ex. P-1) and the defendant became the tenant of the plaintiff. It has also been held that the suit accommodation had been let out to the defendant for non-residential purpose and the plaintiff bonafide requires this accommodation for the wholesale business of chemist which is being carried on by her sons in a rental shop and she has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of her own in her occupation for this purpose in the city. Thus the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was held to have been established and the suit for eviction has been decreed. The suit for eviction was filed on 6-2-1975 and since then more than twenty four years have passed.

(3.) THE appellant is a senior Advocate and he himself has argued this appeal with the assistance of his junior. It is contended that under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act there can be eviction for the requirement of "major sons" and in this case the sons of the plaintiff were minors on the date of the institution of the suit and therefore the suit could not be decreed. Appellant Shri R. P. Tiwari as D. W. 2 has admitted in cross-examination in para 38 that the plaintiff has two sons and they are above 18 years of age. This admission has been used by the trial Court in para 16 of the judgment for holding that the plaintiff's sons are major. Tarachand (P. W. 1) is husband of the plaintiff. He has deposed in para 5 that the age of his elder son is 20 years and the younger son is 18 years. In para 10 he has stated that the age of the elder son is 18 years and the younger son is 15 years. His deposition was recorded on 24-11-1977 and the evidence of the defendant was taken on 11-9-1980 in which he admitted that the sons of the plaintiff are major. Thus both the sons were major when the trial Court held by the judgment dated 29-8-1983 that the ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act is established. That has been affirmed by the first appellate Court. Now both the sons are more than 35 years of age. The ground for eviction under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act was pleaded by amendment in the plaint. In Chhotelal v. Akbar Ali, AIR 1983 M. P. 50, it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that a ground for eviction which was not in existence at the time of filing of the suit, but came into existence during the pendency of the suit, can be made a ground for eviction by amendment of the plaint and a decree for eviction can be passed on such ground, if that ground is established by the plaintiff.