RAMPRASAD AMBARAM VERMA Vs. PRESIDENT INDUSTRIAL COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner was employed by M. P. S. R. T. Corporation, Indore in its Ratlam Depot The petitioner was dismissed on September 1, 1983 from service without any enquiry. The petitioner filed an application under Section 31 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (for short "the Act") against his dismissal in the Labour Court, Indore. The respondent No. 2 denied the allegations made in the application, but stated that under Standard Standing Order 11 (a) and (b) the services of the petitioner were dispensed with. The Learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court after recording of the evidence held that the termination of the services was an illegal retrenchment and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner with back wages. Aggrieved by the order of the Labour Court dated August 27, 1984, the respondent-Corporation tiled an appeal before the Industrial Court. After hearing the appeal, the Industrial Court allowed it and set aside the order of reinstatement of the petitioner passed by the Learned Labour Court. Hence, this petition.

(2.) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the termination of the petitioner's services was illegal and punitive in nature. Although the respondent-M. P. S. R. T. Corporation (henceforth the "corporation" for brevity) supported the dismissal on the ground that it was a simple discharge under Standard Standing Order 11 (a) (b), whereas the Corporation had not set up defence at any point of time, that the petitioner's services were dispensed with because of misconduct. The only question before the Court was whether the order in question was punitive in nature or not. In the event of the order being found to be punitive, the Court had no jurisdiction to allow the employer to lead evidence in support of a charge of misconduct, which was, whereas both the Tribunals below dealt with the case and proceeded to examine as to whether the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct or not? Such an approach was dearly without jurisdiction. The appreciation of the evidence by the Learned Industrial Court was challenged on the ground that it was not proper. Even the finding of the Industrial Court disclosed that the petitioner was held to be guilty of misconduct. Therefore, the order of discharge, being punitive, could not be maintained.

(3.) THE respondent No. 2 Corporation, in its return, has supported the order impugned, passed by respondent No. 1. According to the Corporation, the services of the petitioner were terminated, vide order dated September 1, 1983 and in that order, all the material facts were set out, besides, the petitioner had adverted to the said facts in the application filed under Section 61 read with Sections 31 and 62 of the Act and had also asserted that the allegations levelled against him in the order of termination, were of major misconduct, and were incorrect. Therefore, the Learned Labour Court was justified in granting the prayer of respondent No. 2, to adduce evidence on merits of the misconduct. In the Labour Court itself, the petitioner did not challenge right of the respondent No. 2 to adduce evidence and himself led evidence in rebuttal. Therefore, he is now estopped from saying that the Corporation was wrongly permitted to adduce evidence. According to the Corporation, the services of the petitioner were terminated for the reasons set out in the order of termination. It was pointed out in that order that in a checking held on May 28-29, 1983, the petitioner was caught carrying ticketless passengers, from whom he had already recovered the fare and was also found carrying 560 kilograms of luggage without luggage ticket. This act of the petitioner along with his previous record led the Corporation to take a decision that it was not desirable to retain such an employee in the services. It was, therefore, a case of loss of confidence. Therefore, the Learned Industrial Court was justified in passing the impugned order.