TARABAI Vs. SECOND ADDL JUDGE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is necessary to mention at the outset that this petition under Art.227 of the Constitution was entertained by us on 30-1-1989 on submission being made that the law laid down by two learned Single Judges of this Court to their under-mentioned decisions, required reconsideration (1) Mahavir Kumar v. Phool Chand, 1986 MPRCJ 310 and (2) Govind Prasad Yadav v. Jagdish Prasad Verma, 1987 MPRCJ 296.

(2.) We have, therefore, limited in this matter our decision on the question merely of maintainability of the appeal filed as per memo of appeal (Annexure-P/4) by non-petitioner No. 3 (tenant) in the Court of the Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior. The appeal was filed against order passed on 1-11-1988 by the Rent Controlling Authority, Gwalior, for short, 'the R.C.A.', in a proceeding initiated by the petitioner/landlady under S.23-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, the 'Act'. By that order, the non-applicant-tenant was held in default by the R.C.A. for submitting neither the list of his witnesses nor producing his witnesses to comply with the direction made in that regard and further opportunity to do so as denied to him. In, appeal, the tenant/ appellant submitted that his case could not be closed by the R.C.A. by the impugned order as on that date, an application under O.6, R.17, CPC was filed by him and on that, landlady/respondent was to be heard and no evidence had to be taken. In the memo of appeal S.31 of the Act is quoted as the provision under which the appeal was filed, Counsel for the parties concede that the appeal is pending disposal in the concerned Court and no final decision has been rendered therein.

(3.) Before we examine decisions aforementioned, we have considered it proper to took at the Scheme of the Act. As many as seven Chapters cover the entire corpus of the Act, but special notice has to be taken of the fact that Chapter III-A was inserted by the Legislature for the first time in the year 1983 by Act No. 27 of 1983 apparently in derogation of the general provision contained in Chapter 111, captioned 'Control of Eviction of Tenants". The Act has been further amended in 1985 by Act No. 7 of 1985 and thereunder new S.23-J has been inserted in Chapter III-A. The Chapter is endowed with the caption, "Eviction of Tenants on Grounds of "Bona Fide" Requirement". But, also noteworthy is the heading of S.23-A "Special provision for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide requirement." S.23-B empowers the R.C.A. to issue summons "in relation to very application referred to in S.23-A"and S.23-C specifies the circumstances under which the tenant's entitlement to contest the proceeding initiated u/s.23-A can be circumscribed. However, special mention has to be made of S.23-D because of the matter it contains, as is reflected in its heading "Procedure to be followed by Rent Controlling Authority or grant of leave to tenant to contest". In sub-sec. (1) itself of S.23-D, it is provided that the R.C.A. has to dispose of finally the application made u/s.23-A within six months of the order of granting of leave to the tenant to contest application. U/s.23-E, provision is made for High Court to entertain a revision petition and about that, we have to say much later. Section 23-F specifies that for a period of six months only, the stay order of High Court or of the R.C.A. against the eviction allowed, shall operate. S.23-G deals with recovery of possession for occupation and the right of re-entry of the tenant. S.23-H deals with deposit of rent during pending proceeding for eviction or for revision, while under S.23-I, a landlord is warned against making frivolous application under S.23-A and tenant also is similarly warned against making frivolous application for seeking leave to defend or for adjournment, on the pain of suffering "heavy compensatory costs not exceeding six months rent of the accommodation at a time as the Rent Controlling Authority may fix". Let it be noted now that in 1985, Legislature having reviewed the social conditions and constitutional imperatives, considered it proper to modify the scope and ambit of Chapter III-A and accordingly inserted S.23-J under which it defined the term "landlord" for the purpose of Chapter III-A. In other words, the benefit of the said law enacted in Chapter III-A has come to be limited now, thereafter, to the special category of landlords described in S.23-J, namely, such persons as :