(1.) THE Second Appeal, lodged in this Court in 1973, had come up before one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.) for hearing on 26 -7 -1986. When the appeal came for further hearing on 7 -8 -1986, objection to the maintainability of the appeal was taken on which counsel were heard on that date as also on 14 -8 -1986. It was considered necessary to refer the question to a Larger Bench and accordingly, on reference made to this Bench on 14 -8 -1986, the appeal came to be listed inexplicably lately for hearing before us no 4 -7 -1989. Because of appellants' counsel's : 1984 JLJ 511 insistence based on seven decisions of this Court that the question agitated is not moot any more, it has become necessary for us to prefix a short comment to this order. True, in as many as five decisions cited by Shri K. K. Lahoti, 1983 GLR 153. this Court was required to interpret Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act. 1976, for short, the Act or the Amendment Act. True also, in the referring Order, it was noted that the view expressed in this Court's judgment in Laxmi Chand, AIR 1980 All 42 FB, rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court, was out of tunc the view a Division Bench of Gauhati High Court had expressed in Sudhir Anand,, AIR 1979 P & H 262 and the fact also is that the Referring Judge had spoken for the Court in that case, indeed, in Sudhir Anand (supra), it was noted, albeit with reference to an earlier decision tendered by this Court which Shri Lahoti also cited before us. that this Court's view on the interpretation of the relevant provision of the Amendment Act had been dissented from in decisions rendered by almost all other High Courts in the country. See Mohandas'. Ramniwas : AIR 1978 Ker 201 FB, Pratap Narayan : AIR 1981 Ker 18, Mohd Khan', Kuriakose' Hasumatiben : AIR 1982 Guj 324, Sarabai Agarwalla : AIR 1982 Ori 9 Rangnath Mishra, C.J., (as his Lordship than was) (surveying entire case -law). But, we reminded ourselves of the constitutional imperative that a decision is a precedent only for what it decides and the fact of the matter is that the precise question which has fallen for our decision in this appeal had not come up for consideration of this Court in the decisions cited. We considered, therefore, unnecessary to resolve the controversy, for the purpose of deciding this appeal, as to whether the view expressed by this Court in the decisions cited on the interpretation of clause (a), or clause (g) or even clause (q), of Section 97 (2), of the Amendment Act, required reconsideration by a Larger Bench of three Judges. We could thereby extract further, unduly, disposal of this sateen years old appeal. It would suffice to refer, at this stage, to the five decisions of this Court relied on by Shri Lahoti. These are : Laxmi Chand (supra): Dattatraya Naik, 1983 J1J 242, Sitaram : 1981 JLJ 171. Chuluram : AIR 1980 MP 16 : 1979 JLJ 730, and. Shesh Kumar : 1980 JLJ 338.
(2.) ALTHOUGH Shri Lahoti cited three more decisions, but those being of the years 1960, 1961 and 1967, relevance thereof to the instant controversy emerging from the interpretation of the Amendment Act, 1976 being little or none, reference to these decisions in omitted. The instant appeal arised out of money suit valued at Rs. 3,000/ - and the maintainability of the appeal is challenged on the basis of the bar contemplated under Section 102 C. P. C as mended by the Amendment Act, 1976. Thereunder, it is contemplated that, "No second appeal shall lie in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject -matter of he original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees". Admittedly, the cause of action for the suit arose out of a loan for Rs. 3,000/ - advanced by plaintiffs/ respondents on 17 -4 -1964 to the defendant/ appellants. However, for the resolution of the controversy it is necessary to extract the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act, 1976 : Repeal and savings (1)........(2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act hare come into force of the repeal under subsection (1) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) Clauses (a) to Clause (y) omitted, as not relevant.
(3.) ALTHOUGH the provisions of clauses (11. (m) and (n) of Section 97 (2) are not extracted above, we have felt it necessary still to refer to them to appreciate fully the validity of reliance by Shri Lahoti on clause (z) afore -extracted to support his contention. We have noted that the decision in Laxmi Chand (supra) was rendered with respect to clause (1). In all these three clauses, (1), (in) and (n) there is an express saving made, in terms, using the words "shall not apply to or effect any appeal..." in respect respectively to the provisions of Sections 96. 100 and 100 -A, as amended by Sections 33, 37 and 38 respectively, of the Amendment Act. Because we read something important -in a recent decision of the Apex Court in Ganpat Giri : AIR 1986 SC 589 on the interpretation of Section 97 of the Amendment Act, we propose to, refer first to that decision. Their Lordships referred to the recommendations of the Law commission to observe that the object of Section 97 (!) was to provide currency for same procedural law: w. e. f. 1 -2 -1977, in all Civil Courts wherever CPC was in force. High Court's view that U. P. Amendment of Rule 72 of Order 21 would continue to be operative despite the Amendment Act, was rejected. Due regard had to be paid to the combined effect of sub -sections (1) and (3) of Section 97. it was held. If the Act did not amend Rule 72, that was meant to be retained and made applicable to all proceedings to which local amendment was earlier applicable because the latter lost currency on being repealed by Section 97 (1). The following passage is extracted from para 11 of the decision for its direct relevance to the controversy in the instant appeal :