TULSIRAM VLSHNUDUTTA Vs. RENT CONTROLLING AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is a firm and owns house No. 2344 situated in Wright Town, Jabalpur, which was purchased by it by registered sale-deed on 7th February, 1967. THE firm consists of three partners, one of them being Vishnudutta Dubey. At the time of purchase, the house was in occupation of one Shri Narayanan, a Deputy Collector. Narayanan was thereafter transferred and as the house was likely to fall vacant, the petitioner intimated the fact to the Rent Controlling Authority and also claimed that the house should not be allotted to any one, as it was needed by Vishnudutta, one of the partners of the petitioner firm for his own occupation because his son and brother were students studying in educational institutions at Jabalpur and they were living in a rented house, which was not suitable. THE Rent Controlling Authority by its order passed on 19th June, 1967 allotted the house under section 39 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to Shri D. V. Singh, Deputy Director of Agriculture. He overruled the petitioner's objection to the allotment essentially on the ground that the need of one of the partners to occupy the house cannot be held to be a need of the firm which was the landlord of the house. THE petitioner then filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of allotment made by the Rent Controlling Authority.

(2.) SECTION 39 of the Act deals with control of letting. Sub-section (1) enables the Collector or the Authorised Officer (who in the present case happened to be the Rent Controlling Authority) to require a landlord by general or special order to give information in writing when any accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant. Sub-section (2) empowers these Authorities to allot any accommodation which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant in favour of a Government Officer. This power is subject to an important proviso which reads:

(3.) THE next point is whether a different rule should apply when a firm is the landlord. Now, a firm, under our legal system, is not a legal entity except for fiscal purposes; it is merely a compendious name to describe its partners; Parushottam and Co. v. M/s. Manilal and Sons, AIR 1961 SC 325, p. 330; Mandaha Devi v. M. Ramnarain P. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1718, p. 1720. Because of this legal position in cases where a firm is the landlord, in reality and substance the partners constituting the firm are the landlords. It is true that ordinarily a partnership property can be used only for the purpose of the firm and not for the benefit of one of its partners; but when all partners consent there can be no objection to the use of any partnership property for the benefit of one of the partners. THEre is thus no legal basis for treating the case of a firm differently. In our view, if the firm needs the accommodation for the occupation of all or any one of its partners, the requirement of "his own occupation" contained in the proviso would be satisfied. Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Nanjappa v. Dulabdas and Co., ILR (1967) 2 Mad 506.