(1.) IN this case the controversy centres round the correctness of an order made by the Additional Tahsildar, Gopad Banas, under section 22(1) of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and upheld in appeal by the Collector, Sidhi, allotting certain lands to the respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
(2.) THE material facts are that two villages, namely, Amaba Tola and Bagarhkhas, situated in district Sidhi of the former Vindhya Pradesh State were pawai Jagir villages of one Raghobhansingh. After his death the villages were held by his two widowed daughters -in -law, the petitioner Jayaram Kumari and a co -widow known as Kathahwali (deceased). In 1943, Sampatsingh, father of respondent No. 1; Pratipalsingh, father of respondent No. 3; and Yogendra Bahadursingh, respondent No. 4 instituted a suit against the two widows claiming a declaration that the two widows were entitled to hold the villages only for maintenance during their life -time and that they were lawfully entitled to succeed to the villages. This suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs were only reversioners and had no claim whatsoever on the villages during the life -time of the widows. Thereafter, in certain revenue proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner, Sidhi, an order was made on 10th September 1948 by which the pawai villages were mutated in favour of Sampatsingh, Pratipalsingh and Yogendra Bahadursingh with the reservation that the widows would retain the possession of the villages for their maintenance during their life -time. Thus Jayaram Kumari and Kathahwali continued to remain in possession of the villages. In 1951 when Kathahwali died disputes again arose between the parties as to the possession of the villages and proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were started. In those proceedings Jayaram Kumari's possession of the villages was maintained and Sampatsingh was directed to institute a civil suit for establishing his right to the possession of the villages. Thereafter, Jayaram Kumari granted a tenancy patta of the entire sir lands in the two villages to her nephew Ranbahadursingh who is other petitioner in the present case. In the annual khasra papers for the year 1952 -53 Ranbahadursingh was shown as in possession of the said sir lands. A similar entry was repeated for the years 1953 -54 and 1954 -55. On 19th January 1956 respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 complained to the Tahsildar, Gopad Banas, that Ranbahadursingh's name had been wrongly entered as the person in possession of the sir lands and that in fact the possession was with Jayaram Kumari, and that, therefore, her name be entered as the person in possession of the sir lands. After the coming into force of the Act on 30th June 1953, the respondents made an application under section 20 of the Act for allotment to them of the land which was in Raghobhansingh's possession as sir land. It was on this application that the Additional Tahsildar made an order under section 22(1) of the Act allotting the lands to respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
(3.) THERE was some argument at the Bar as regards the person who was in possession of the land today and as regards the question whether that person was entitled to retain possession of the land. This question does not really arise n these proceedings initiated on respondents Nos. 1 to 4's application for the allotment of the land under section 22(1). In these proceedings the question that arises is about the allotment of the land to respondents Nos. 1 to 4 and not whether the petitioners are entitled to continue to hold the land that may be in their possession today. Petitioner No. 2's claim that be is in possession of the land today has been disputed by the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who say that in fact they are in possession of the property. The revenue authorities have not given any finding as to the person or persons in actual possession of the land today. The Collector determined the question of possession as evidenced by entries in revenue papers. He did not give any consideration to the question of actual possession. Be that as it may, the person in actual possession, if be thinks that he has a legal right to continue to remain in possession, is at liberty to take appropriate steps for the retention of his possession or for protection against dispossession.