STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. R S BADAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN the present intra-court appeal filed by the appellants under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal)Adhiniyam, 2005 has been directed against the order dated 23. 11. 2004 passed by the learned single Judge in w. P. No. 8644/2003 (R. S. Badal Vs. State of M. P. and others ). Be it noted, the original respondent filed the original application before the State Administrative Tribunal challenging the order of punishment imposed on him. The said application was registered as O. A. No. 146/1994. After abolition of the Tribunal the case was transferred to this court and reregistered as W. P. No. 8644/2003. The writ petition was heard by the learned single Judge and by order dated 23. 11. 2004 the said petition has been allowed. The facts leading to the case are that the original petitioner was serving on the post of Sub-Inspector and he was subjected to a departmental enquiry for certain misconduct. The Superintendent of Police by its order dated 30. 1. 1992 (Annexure P-XII) imposed the punishment reducing the original writ petitioner to minimum basic pay of the Sub-Inspector for one year. The original petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of punishment to the Deputy Inspector General of police. The appellate authority partly allowed the appeal preferred by the original petitioner and the punishment of reduction of pay equivalent to one increment for one year was imposed by order dated 30th October, 1992 (Annexure p-XIV ). Against the said order a revision was preferred by the deceased petitioner to the Director General of Police which was rejected on 29. 1. 1993 (Annexure P-XV ). Before the learned single Judge a question was raised about the competence of the Superintendent of police to pass the order of punishment. It was submitted that the appointing authority of the deceased petitioner is the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the superintendent of Police has no authority or jurisdiction to initiate the departmental proceedings and thereafter to impose the punishment. The learned single Judge accepted the contentions raised by the deceased petitioner and held that the appointing authority of the deceased petitioner was Deputy Inspector General of police and therefore the punishment imposed by the superintendent of Police is without any jurisdiction or authority. The learned single Judge has relied upon the police Regulation 222 which has also been reproduced in the judgment itself. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Undisputedly, the original petitioner i. e. the respondent herein was holding the post of Sub-Inspector and according to the Police Regulation 222 the appointing authority of the Sub-Inspector is the deputy Inspector General of Police and on the basis of the same no punishment can be imposed by the superintendent of Police. It is argued on behalf of the appellant-State that before inflicting the punishment, the approval of the competent authority was sought by letter dated 12. 12. 1991 (Annexure A-1 ). The letter as such was not filed before the learned single Judge but the same has been filed along with the appeal. Submission put forth on behalf of the appellant is considered. A careful perusal of the letter dated 12. 12. 1991 (Annexure A-1) does not show that any approval was taken by the Superintendent of Police for inflicting the punishment on the deceased petitioner. The letter only states that whatever action is to be taken, it is to be taken at the instance of the Superintendent of police. In view of the above, it is not a case that any approval was sought by the Superintendent of Police before inflicting the punishment. On the basis of the same, it cannot be said that the letter dated 12. 12. 1991 (Annexure A-1) filed along with the appeal, in fact, is an approval which was obtained before inflicting the punishment. It is also to be seen that before the learned single judge a different stand was taken by the State, which is apparently in contradiction with the stand taken in the appeal. It was urged before the learned single Judge that though initially the punishment was imposed by the superintendent of Police but ultimately in appeal the punishment has been reduced by the Deputy Inspector general of Police and on that basis it was submitted before the learned single Judge that since the punishment has been imposed by the Deputy Inspector General of police who has jurisdiction to impose the punishment, therefore, in the present case, the order of punishment is proper. Submission so put forth before us about seeking of approval was not the ground taken before the learned single Judge. The ground raised in appeal before us as such is also not substantiated by material on record that before imposing the punishment, the necessary approval was obtained by the Superintendent of Police from the deputy Inspector General of Police. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any illegality committed by the learned single Judge in allowing the writ petition. In the result, the writ appeal is sans merit and it is dismissed accordingly.