RAMSINGH Vs. STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) RESPONDENT No.3 claiming himself to be a person covered under the provisions of the M.P. Anusuchit Jati Tatha Anusuchit Janjati (Rini Sahayata) Adhiniyam, 1967 as amended by the Amending Act No. 33/72, moved an application under section 8 (3) of the Act, inter alia pleading that as he was a debtor covered under the provisions of the Act and on the enforcement of the Act the debts stood discharged, therefore, an order be passed in his favour and the property be restored back to him. Respondent No.4 alone was arrayed as the defendant/non -applicant in the application filed before the Sub -Divisional Officer. The said respondent No.4 contested the petition and after having lost before the S.D.O. took up the matter under section 22 of the said Act to the Collector. On the date of hearing, as the counsel for respondent No.4 did not appear, the Collector dismissed the revision petition for want of prosecution. An application for restoration was filed immediately but the same also suffered dismissal therefore, the matter was taken upto the Commissioner of the Division concerned. The said revision was also dismissed as the Commissioner was of the opinion that the appeal against dismissal of the revision or rejection of restoration application would not be maintainable under the Act. After dismissal of the said appeal, the petitioners who claim to have purchased the land either directly from the respondent No. 3 or from Shobharam have filed this writ petition.

(2.) SHRI Saxena for the petitioners in support of the petition submits that as the Debt Relief Court was established on 10.8.73 under the State notification No. 16.4.73 -XXV -II. therefore an application under section 8 (3) was required to be filed within 60 days from the date of establishment of the Court and as an application under section 8 (3) was not filed within 60 days from the date of establishment of the Court. the S.D.O. could not assume any jurisdiction. According to him, the application under section 8 (3) of the Act was filed on 15.5.74, which was patently barred by limitation. He also submits that the petitioners and many others who had purchased the property from respondent No.3 Beniram were not joined as parties, though their names were recorded in the revenue papers. He submits that the procedure adopted by the S.D.O. and non -joinder of necessary parties who claim right over the property has lead to illegalities which go to the very root of the jurisdiction. On the other hand, Shri Thakur learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that the order dated 29.3.78 passed in favour of the respondent No.3 was never challenged by the petitioners under section 22 of the Act or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India immediately, therefore, the petition filed in the year 1986 must suffer rejection on the ground of delay and laches. Regarding delay in submission of the application under section 8 (3) he submits that respondent No.3 being illiterate and as he had no knowledge of law, if had filed the application somewhat delayed, the delay be condoned and in any case his application would not suffer rejection on the ground of limitation.

(3.) TRUE it is that section 8 (3) of the Act mandates that the debtor has to apply to the Debt Relief Court within 60 days of the establishment of the said Court for determination of his debts giving out the names and full addresses of the creditors. It is also true that section 8 does not provide for extension of time or condo -nation of delay. It is, however, to be seen that the application of the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been specifically excluded. Section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Applying the first part of sub -section (2) of section 29, it is to be held that according to section 3 of the Limitation Act read with section 8 (3) of the Act, the limitation for filing such application was only 60 days. The latter part of sub -section (2) is that the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. These provisions make it very clear that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Indian Limitation Act would not be applicable, if the special or local law expressly excludes their application. In the instant case, it is to be found that section 8 (3) or any other provision of the Rini Sahayata Act does not expressly excludes the application of sections 4 to 24 (inclusive). In view of the language employed in sub -section (2) of section 29 and non -exclusion of application of sections 4 to 24, it has to be held that if an application under section 8 (3) is not 'filed within the period of limitation prescribed by section 8 (3) itself, then an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for extension of time/condo -nation of delay can certainly be filed and the authority or Court before which such an application is filed would have complete jurisdiction to decide the application in accordance with law.