(1.) HEARD the learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the plaintiff -respondent, who has put in appearance in this appeal has also been heard. Perused the record.
(2.) THE appellants feel aggrieved by the decree passed by the First Appellate Court whereunder allowing the appeal of the plaintiff and reversing the decree of the trial Court, the suit for eviction of the defendant from the accommodation in dispute has been decreed. The plaintiff had filed the suit asserting that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. It was asserted that the defendant was defaulter within the meaning of section 12(1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. It was also asserted that the requisite conditions contemplated under section 12(1) (a), 12(1) (c) and 12(1) (e) of the aforesaid Act also stood satisfied and the defendant was liable for eviction on these grounds also.
(3.) IN the aforesaid view of the matter the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the disclaimer of the title of the plaintiff contained in the written statement filed by the tenant -defendant was not sufficient and could not be made a basis for the decree for eviction is devoid of merit and is not at all acceptable. The finding returned by the First Appellate Court that the need of the plaintiff for the accommodation in dispute was genuine and bonafide and no other suitable alternative accommodation was available to the plaintiff which could satisfy his need, is a finding based on an appraisal of the evidence and the materials on record. This finding does not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference in the present proceedings by this Court. Further, on the own showing of the defendant he had not paid any rent. He was, therefore, clearly a defaulter as contemplated under section 12(1) (a) of the Act and was liable to eviction. The finding even so far as this aspect is concerned which has been returned against the defendant is based on an appraisal of the evidence and the material on record, and does not appear to suffer from any such legal infirmity which may justify an interference in the present proceedings by this Court while exercising the limited jurisdiction envisaged under section 100 CPC.