(1.) These two matters we heard together because a common question of some importance bearing on the interpretation of a benignant statute is involved in these cases.
(2.) Petitioners in both cases have a common grievance that the private respondent, namely, respondent No. 3 in each case, was not entitled to avail the benefit of the Madhya Pradesh Samaj ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi-Dharakon ka Udhar Dene Walon ke Bhumi Hadapane Sambandhi Kuchkron Se paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976, for short, the 'Adhiniyam', for several reasons. However, the common contention of law in both cases is that the Adhiniyam must be read as a Temporary Enactment and not Perpetual one, or, in other words, enacted with a limited life, which has expired More precisely, Shri Arun Mishra, appearing for the petitioners, has contended the adhiniyam was meant to take care of certain past transactions and it had accordingly merely retrospective operation, in respect of a specified "time-zone".
(3.) The several aspects of counsel's contention above-referred have indeed raised an important question of law for our decision. It is no doubt true that the Legislature is competent to enact both perpetual and Temporary statutes, but it is equally true that the life of a statute, when it is limited, clear indication of its intention in that regard is expressed by the Legislature by making an express provision in the enactment itself in that regard. Indeed, Emergency statutes, such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1949 or the Defence of India Act, 1962 are instances of the Legislature enacting Temporary statutes, when in terms the life of the statute and expiry the were mentioned. A permanent or perpetual statute is such which contains no provision indicating its limited life or duration of operation and would, therefore, continue to be operative indefinitely, to have evidently full force of law until the statute is either expressly or impliedly repealed. In any case, the position which cannot be disputed is that the extent or operation of a statute or its duration of operation has to be read in the provision of statute itself. Bearing this elementary principle of statutory interpretation, we scanned through the whole gamut of the matter enacted in the Adhiniyam beginning with the long title of the Adhiniyam, but our critical enquiry has confirmed our tentative view that counsel's contention is wholly meritless.