RANCHHORDAS HARISHCHANDRA PACHAL Vs. RUKMANIBAI BHAGWANDAS SHASTRI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the defendant-tenant against whom the lower appellate Court has passed a decree for eviction along with the claim of arrears of rent and mesne profits, by holding that the ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act (here-in-after referred to as the Act) was available to the plaintiff.

(2.) A brief calendar of facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal is that Smt. Rukmanibai, the plaintiff, widow of Bhagwandas Shastri, brought the suit out of which this appeal arises claiming arrears of rent and mesne profits. The ground put forth for claiming eviction was the default in payment of rent as contemplated by section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. According to the allegation made in the plaint, the defendant was in arrears of rent after 31-10-1967, and despite the service of notice of demand, he failed to pay the amount of arrears and did not comply with the requirements of the quit notice served on him. The defendant resisted the claim of the plaintiff by contending that originally Bhagwandas undisput-edly being the owner of the suit house his landlord and after his death all his legal representatives became his landlord despite the fact that he has been paying rent of the plaintiffs alone after the death of Bhagwandas. The objection was that the plaintiff alone could not terminate the tenancy and was also not competent to bring the suit for eviction without joining the other legal representatives, i. e. the sons and daughters of the late Bhagwandas, in the suit. It was also contended that the defendant has paid rent up to 31st August 1968 and, therefore, the quantum of arrears of rent was in dispute. The trial Court found that the plaintiff alone was competent to bring the suit. The relationship of landlord and tenant was in between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the quit notice issued by the plaintiff validly determined the tenancy. The trial Court accordingly decreed the claim for arrears of rent but dismissed the claim for eviction on the ground that the default in payment of rent was liable to be condoned and since the entire arrears of rent were deposited during the pendency of the suit, there was no case for granting a decree for eviction. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the dismissal of her claim for eviction. The defendant filed cross-objection as against decree directing payment of arrears of lent passed against him by the trial Court holding that there was the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant. The defendant, however, did not pay proper court-fees on the cross-objection and that was found by the lower appellate Court to be sufficient ground for dismissing the same summarily. However, despite that, the lower appellate Court dealt with the contention about the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiff and the defendant and the competency of smt. Rukmanibai to bring the suit for eviction after determining the tenancy by service of quit notice. The lower appellate Court after due consideration of the material on record came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence from which it could be safely inferred that the defendant has been treating the plaintiff alone as his landlady and that the relationship of landlord and tenant was in between the defendant and the plaintiff alone. In the earlier proceedings also, the defendant had admitted the plaintiff Smt. Rukmanibai alone to be his landlady. Nothing could be pointed out to show that the aforesaid finding recorded by the lower appellate Court was bad either in law or on fact.

(3.) WHAT was mainly urged before this Court at this stage in second appeal was that since the defendant has raised a dispute in the written statement about the quantum of arrears of rent, the trial Court was bound to make an order provisionlly fixing the amount of arrears of rent liable to be deposited in accordance with the provisions of section 13 (2) of the Act, for securing the compliance of section 13 (1) of the Act. It was contended that since the same was not done, the provisions of section 13 (1) of the Act remained arrested and under these circumstances despite various defaults having been committed in the matter of payment of rent within the prescribed period after service of notice of the suit and month to month deposit, the defendant-tenant did not lose the protection of section 12 (3) or section 13 (5) of the Act and, therefore, no decree could be passed under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. In these premises, it was contended that since eviction was not claimed on any other ground the suit for eviction was liable to be dismissed.