PREMCHAND JAIN Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a joint petition by three petitioners under Article 226 of the constitution of India for issue of a writ of mandamus against the State of madhya Pradesh and the Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior, directing them not to enforce the order dated 20th Oct. 1977 issued by the Divisional Forest officer.

(2.) THE petitioners who are three different parties entered into separate contracts for sale of fuel In the city of Gwalior according to the terms and conditions of the agreements entered into by them with the Government of madhya Pradesh. The petitioners' case is that under the terms of the aforesaid agreements they were to purchase fuel from the Government of M, P. , and sell it to the consumers at the rate of Rs. 16/- per quintal of the unsplit fuel and Rs. 18/-per quintal of the split fuel. The agreements were for different periods but all of them are to expire by the end of April 1978. However, the Divisional Forest Officer, Gwalior issued an order to the petitioners on 20th Oct. 1977 intimating to them that the Government had decided to sell fuel at the rate of rs. 8/- to 10/- per quintal in specified places and, therefore, fresh contracts would be given to retailers. He, therefore, directed the petitioners to sell away the stock of fuel with them at the contractual rate by 30th Oct. 1977 and, thereafter, if they wanted to have licence for sale of fuel, they should apply on the prescribed form on or before 30th Oct, 1977. The petitioners have challenged this order on the ground that the Divisional Forest Officer was not competent to issue the same.

(3.) WE may observe. In the first in stance, that the petition suffers from the defect of misjoinder ot parties and cause of action. There are three different contracts entered into by the three petitioners on different dates and for different periods. Each petitioner is not interested in the contract entered into by another. Thus, there are clearly three different causes of action joined together in the petition, In ordinary course, we would have permitted the petitioners to treat this petition on behalf of one of the petitioners and to file separate petitions on behalf of the other two petitioners. But in view of the conclusion to which we have arrived on the question of maintainability of the writ petition, we do not consider it necessary to adopt that course,