CHIRONGILAL KASHIRAM Vs. SHANKERLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal is at the instance of the plaintiff-landlord whose claim for eviction of the respondent-tenants from the suit shop has been dismissed by both the Courts below by holding that the plaintiff could not establish the ground of bona fide need of the suit-shop lor the purposes of his business.

(2.) APPARENTLY, the aforesaid finding on which the suit has been dismissed by the Courts below is a finding on a pure question of fact. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, however, raised the following contentions and made an effort to show that the aforesaid finding was vitiated due to various errors of law committed by the Courts below.

(3.) THE first contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant needs to be mentioned for simply being rejected. The contention put forth was that once plaintiff landlord mentions any one of the grounds as specified in clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (here-in-after referred to as the 'act'), the Civil Court should pass a decree for eviction if it is otherwise satisfied that the tenancy has been properly determined and need not proceed to try and record a finding on the existence of the grounds referred to above. The seemingly ingenuous argument further put forth in support of this astounding contention was that Section 17 of the Act provides a check on the misuse of claiming eviction by falsely raising such grounds of bona fide need inasmuch as according to the provisions of the said section a plaintiff landlord who secures a decree on the ground of bona fide need of the suit accommodation either for residential purposes or for non-residential purposes if does not occupy the suit accommodation for the purposes in question after securing vacant possession, is liable for action and the tenant has also been given a right to claim re-entry. Shri B. D. Gupta pointed out that his contention finds support from the language of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act which simply prohibits entertaining a suit which does not disclose a ground specified in the various clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. The argument was that it does not prohibit the court from making a decree in the absence of any such ground having been established. But as seeming ingenuity does not pay elsewhere it does not pay in the Court of law. For the purposes of interpretation, the language used in sub-section (1)of section 12 of the Act is at par with the words that no decree shall be passed unless any one of the grounds specified in the various clauses of sub-section (1) is established. Once the institution of the suit is prohibited, it is clear that before proceeding to make a decree for eviction the Court must be satisfied that any one of the grounds as specified in sub-section (1)6f section 12 of the Act is established. If the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will lead to an anomalous situation. Large number of tenants will be uprooted merely on the say of the landlords and will be required to claim re-entry when it is found that the plaintiff-landlords did not occupy the accommodations for their own need. The purpose of the Act is to protect the interest of the tenant against eviction merely at the will of the landlord.