NIRBHAYDAS GANGARAM Vs. GULAB BAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition is directed against an order passed by the Election Tribunal, hoshangabad, in Election Petition No. 334 of 1957. The order itself is in two parts having been passed in skeleton form, first on 8-8-1957 and amplified with reasons in a subsequent order delivered on 26-8-1957. The two orders in question refer to the form of the election petition and its contents. As is usual in these election petitions, certain allegations of a general character were averred. Subsequently, two applications for amendment were filed by the present petitioner asking for the incorporation of some details, which were allowed. In the opinion of the Election Tribunal the petition still remained incomplete, because details of some of the particulars were not supplied. In these two orders the Election Tribunal commanded the petitioner to furnish those details and to complete the averments in respect of some of the grounds on which the election of the first and the fourth respondents here was challenged. The learned counsel for the respondent (No. 1) frankly concedes that in view of the decision of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Election Tribunal Jabalpur, M. P. No. 155 of 1957 D/- 9-9-1957 : (AIR 1957 Madh Pra 168) (A) the Election Tribunal did not possess the power of ordering suo motu the Supply of such details. The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contends that in view of this concession the whole of the order should be quashed. The counsel for respondent no. 1, however, contends that the finding given that these particulars were necessary to frame an issue should be sustained and the rest of the order quashed.

(2.) THE controversy before us has really narrowed down to a very insignificant dimension. It is conceded on all hands that as a result of the decision in Kamath's case (A) the Court was incompetent after the amendment of the Representation of the People Act to order suo motu the supply of better or indeed of any particulars. In that decision the Division Bench has been at pains to show that that power has deliberately been taken away, so that election, petitions are not turned into prosperous suits continuing in Courts for a number of years. Indeed, the time limit which has been set upon the disposal of these election petitions, viz. six months, itself shows that the legislature intended that the controversy should be decided in a very expeditious and business like manner. For this purpose the amendment was introduced, and we say that in our opinion the amendment must have been introduced to obviate all such happenings in these election disputes. Formerly, as also in this case, the tribunals were noticed to intervene with their own suggestion as to how the particulars should be pleaded and what should be averred and what not. By the amendment of the law this power of the tribunals has been taken away -- and we say quite rightly -- so that these election disputes may terminate within a reasonable time.

(3.) AS a result of this it is quite obvious that the Election Tribunal went out of its way in ordering particulars. The law requires these particulars to be supplied with as much detail and circumspection as is possible at the very start. The law, however, gives the petitioner a chance to apply for amendment if there has been some omission, subject, however, that the amendment must be related to some particulars alleged in the petition or some corrupt practice which is the subject-matter of the controversy. Short of this, there is no other means of getting an original petition before the election Tribunal amended or amplified. We, therefore, hold on the strength of the earlier decision that the Election Tribunal was in error in ordering these particulars on its own. We quash the order of the Election Tribunal relating to the ordering of the particulars.