K C SHARMA Vs. ELECTION TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition is by K. C. Sharma who challenges before us an order made by the election Tribunal, Chhatarpur on 7th September, 1957 in election petition No. 270 of 1957. By that order the Election Tribunal partly allowed an application for amendment of particulars in the election petition filed by the present petitioner. By the present petition the petitioner challenges that portion of the order by which amendments sought to be introduced were disallowed.

(2.) THE election petition contained allegations of corrupt practices indulged by the returned candidate. It purported to set out particulars of the corrupt practices in three schedules which are numbered, A, B and C. By the application for amendment the petitioner sought to introduce details of the corrupt practices in all the three schedules. Some of these amendments were allowed and the others rejected. It is not necessary to refer to the various amendments which are quite numerous and are not capable of being briefly summarised. We have, however, examined, the original schedules, the proposed amendments and the orders thereon by the election Tribunal carefully. Having considered these amendments and the reasons therefor, we think that we should not interfere by way of our extraordinary powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution at this stage in this case.

(3.) TO begin with, the Full Bench decision given by Krishnan, J. and us in Babulal sharma v. Brijnarayan Brijesh, Misc. Petn. No. 249 of 1957, D/- 22-1-1958: (AIR 1958 Madh Pra 175) (A), was cited before us in support. In that case, as also here, the learned Election Tribunal had taken the view that particulars of a corrupt practice already given in the election petition could be amended and amplified, but that particulars could not be given for the first time of a corrupt practice alleged in petition. We pointed out in the Full Bench case that the ruling of their Lordships of the supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, (S) AIR 1957 SC 444 (B), was applicable to the interpretation of Sub-section (5) of Section 90 of the representation of the People Act, 1951. We, however, did interfere in that case, because the decision of the Tribunal proceeded upon a wrong assumption of the law and the reasons for rejecting the amendments were not fully or convincingly given.