LAWS(MPH)-1958-3-14

LALJI GANGAPRASAD Vs. RAMJICHIRKUT

Decided On March 31, 1958
Lalji Gangaprasad Appellant
V/S
Ramjichirkut Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) B .S. Shukla The applicant is cultivator of village Chachedi, tahsil Kawardha, district Durg, and applied for some vacant house -sites adjoining his own house. His application was opposed before the Tahsildar by the non -applicants on the ground that the disputed land was in their possession and could not be allotted to the applicant. The Tahsildar upheld the objection and successive appeals to the Sub -Divisional Officer and the Additional Deputy Commissioner also failed Hence this revision.

(2.) THE order passed by the Sub -Divisional Officer and the Additional Deputy Commissioner are really difficult to appreciate on the point whether the land was or was not vacant for allotment, the Sub -Divisional Officer's observations are: the sites were originally in possession of the objectors (non -applicants) but it is not clear whether the sites were in their continuous possession for 12 years immediately before 1948 -49...Leaving apart the question of exclusive title of the objectors..., it is definite that the sites are disputed ones and the Naib -Tahsildar has, therefore, rightly rejected the application.

(3.) I find that the possession has been very hotly disputed by both the parties. In view of this dispute over possession it cannot be conclusively said whether the site is vacant or not. I wish the parties had examined the village patwari and the kotwar in support of their contentions. In view of a dispute over possession, the S.D.O. was perfectly justified in rejecting the appeal....Apart from the failure to deal with the issues involved, the two appellate Courts appear to have been obsessed with the idea that since possession over the land was disputed, they could do nothing in the matter except lamenting over the omissions committed by the parties. Neither Court recorded a finding as to whether the land was or was not vacant. If they thought the enquiry by the Tahsildar was defective or lacking on material points, they could have remanded the case or issued other suitable directions to enable a clear decision to be taken. It appears that, perhaps, on the analogy of partition cases under Section 93, Tenancy Act, the appellate Courts thought that once there was a dispute about title, the revenue Courts' jurisdiction ended and the parties must seek their remedy in the civil Court. If that was behind the back of their mind, they entirely misled themselves.