STATE OF M P Vs. SURESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Second Appeal filed by the appellant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 16-7-98 passed by Additional District judge, Sardarpur, District Dhar in Regular Civil Appeal No. 13-A/97, whereby dismissed the application filed by the State under Section 5 of the Limitation act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, which was barred by 12 days, saying therein that no sufficient ground is made out for condonation of delay. This Second Appeal was admitted on 16-4-1999 on the following substantial questions of law :-" (a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellate Court below erred in law in rejecting the appellant's application for condonation of delay and dismissing their appeal as time barred?"

(2.) I have heard Shri Lokesh Bhatnagar, learned Government advocate for the appellants, and perused the order passed by the Lower Appellate court. In the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of 12 days' delay it was submitted that the certified copy of the judgment was forwarded to the office of Collector which was not received in time and in the meantime, the Officer-in-charge/tehsildar was transferred and he was also busy in some Government work. It was also submitted that in the meantime, the real brother of the Officer-in-charge became seriously ill and subsequently, he died on 9-5-1997, therefore, the Officer-in-charge could not contact to Government Advocate to file appeal in time. In support of application, the affidavit of Advocate was filed but the application was dismissed on the ground that the affidavit of Officer-in-charge was not filed and delay was not explained satisfactorily.

(3.) IN case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :-