ARJUNLAL AGRAWAL Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is directed against the order dated 19.8.1996, passed by the District Judge, Bilaspur exercising his power of the 'appellate officer' under section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (henceforth 'the act'), whereby the District Judge has dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants against the order dated 19.1.1988, passed by the Estate Officer, appointed by the non -applicant under 'the Act', evicting the applicant from public premises belonging to the non -applicant, Union of India. The disposal of this revision shall govern the disposal of connected civil revisions as mentioned below: -

(2.) IT is necessary to decide the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Union of India, the non -applicani in all above cases. Shri S. K. Mukherjee learned counsel for the non -applicant argued that the revision lies against the order of appellate officer in view of the fact that the appellate officer cannot be said to be a Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judtge of the concerned jurisdiction has been named an "appellate officer' under section 9 of "the Act". The powers of hearing the appeal have not been conferred on the District Court or the District Judge directly. The use of words 'an appellate officer' excludes all other powers, a 'District Judge' may have as a Judge of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the meaning of section 3(17) of a General Clauses Act as demarcates him from District Court. The words "District Judge, in the context refers to the person who is the head of the judiciary in the Civil District. It excludes other judges who may be exercising similar powers under the provisions of the M. P. Civil Court Act, 1958 read with the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel pointed out that section 9(6) of "the Act' makes the Chief Judge or the principal Judge of City Civil Court a "District Judge' and a presidency town, a "District" by a deeming fiction. For this reason, the chief or principal Judge of City Civil Court in a presidency town shall been appellate officer' under Section 9 of the Act. The learned counsel further argued that the appellate officer' appointed under Section 9 of 'the Act' did not exercise the same powers as the District Judge constituted under the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 would do. The powers of District Judge exercising the powers of District Court limited by M. P. Civil Court Act. 1958 and also by the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, by virtue of specific powers conferred upon the appellate officer under Section 9 of 'the Act' he can designate any other judicial officer in the District of not less than the years "standing, an appellate officer' under the Act. Such delegation of powers of the appellate officer are in the discretion of the District Judge. He can canfer the power of the "appellate officer' on any of the judicial officer serving under his central in the District by passing the officers, who may be senior in rank or exercising higher jurisdiction by virtue of provisions of M.P. Civil Courts Act, 1958 read with the Code of Civil Procedure, as presiding officers of superior Courts. Learned counsel for the non -applicant further argued that Section 9(2) of 'the Act provides various periods of limitation for appeal against orders, passed by the Estate Officer under Sections 5, 5 -D, 5 -C and 7 thereof and confers the power on the 'appellate officer' to condone the delay. In filing the appeal as per proviso to sub -section (2) of Section 9 of 'the Act'. Section 9(3) of 'the Act' provides that the 'appellate officer' shall have power to stay enforcement of an order under appeal subject to proviso to that section. It was sub -section (5) of Section 9 of the Act' which conferred power on the 'appellate officer' to grant costs of appeal. The leanred counsel, therefore, argues that the Legislature has deliberately made the District Judge an 'appellate officer' with powers to delegate the authority of the 'appellate officer' in his discretion to a Judge of standing of at least ten years in the District. This departure from usual language by conferring power of hearing the appeal, on the District Judge is very significant. According to the learned counsel for the non -applicant, nothing prevented the Legislature from conferring the powers of hearing appeal on the District Judge as a Court and the rest would follow. There would be no need to provide for special powers under 'the Act' for condoning delay. In case, the Legislature had chosen to confer appellate powers on the District Judge. There was no need to confer power of granting stay in such case. Nor was it necessary to confer the power of awarding costs, in case, the 'appellate officer' be construed as a Court. The learned counsel argued that Section 9 of the Act conferred upon the District Judge powers of statutory Tribunal and not of a Court. The learned counsel for the non -applicant brought to the notice of the Court Section 10 of the Act' and argued that it makes interalia, the appellate order final save as otherwise expressly provided in 'the Act' and bars the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in respect of the subject matter of appeal in an original civil suit, application or execution proceedings and restrains the Civil Court or any other authority from granting any injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken against the powers conferred on an 'appellate officer' or Estate Officer' under the Act. The leanred counsel for the non applicant argued that lull ef lect should be given to the words of Section 10 of 'the Act'. It should, therefore, be held that the finality attached to order passed by the appellate officer cannot be given a go by, by construing the words 'final' be limited to 'the Act' itself and not to alter statutes. The learned counsel for the non -applicant elaborates that the order of the appellate officer cannot be questioned by - (i) an original suit (ii) any application or (iii) in execution proceedings (iv) nor can be restrained from exercising the power under 'the Act'. The learned counsel for the non -applicant submitted that the "appellate officer' is a Tribunal constituted under the Act and it cannot be deemed to be a "Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That Section applied to a Court in a limited sense, i.e. Court constituted under the provision of Civil Procedure Code and the M. P. Civil Courts Act, 1958. It relates to normal hierarchy of Courts. In the submission of learned counsel for the non -applicant, the conclusion of the learned single Judge of this Court, interpreting analogous provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958 in the case of Hargovind Sharma Vs. Divisional Engineer, Railway Administration, South Eastern Railway Bilaspur and anothers A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 7, appeared to be correct. The learned counsel for the non -applicant cited the following other decision in support of his contention: -

(3.) BEFORE beginning to embark upon the discussion of the case, it is necessary to notice that the Act so for as property of Union of India in concerned, falls within the ambit of entry No. 32 of List I (Union List) of Schedule 7. This entry empowers Parliament to frame laws in respect of property of Union of India and revenue therefrom. This power is subject to legislation by the State in respect of property of Union of India, save in so far as Parliament by law otherwise provides. Apart from supremacy of power of Parliament on the subject -matter of entry, the State of Madhya Pradesh has not framed any law like 'the Act It is well established that the Act falls within this entry. In the case of Shrimati Saiyada Mossarrat Versus Hindustan Steel Ltd. Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai (M.P.) and others, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 406 the Supreme Court held that 'the Act' is covered by Entry No. 32 of List I of Schedule 7 so far as the law relates to property of Union of India and it was stated at page 411 that: -