ARJUNLAL GUPTA Vs. STATE OF M.P.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY this petition under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks the relief that order No. 27 -B/21/95 -96, dated 3.2.96, passed by respondent No.3 by which the petitioner has been suspended from the office of Sarpanch, Pandatarai and all consequential orders be quashed.

(2.) THE brief facts necessary for disposal of the petition are that the petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Pandatarai in the year 1994. A police report was lodged by the petitioner against Trilochan Singh and Manindar Singh for comission of offences under section 394, 506 and 294 IPC. A challan was filed after due investigation in the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Mungeli. On the report of the other party, offence under section 395 IPC was registered against the petitioner, matter was investigated and challan was filed in the competent Court. Later on charges under section 395 IPC were framed against the petitioner, he having denied the charges, the case was later on fixed on 18th and 19th March. One Panch, namely, Safar Khan moved an application to the respondent No.3 and made a request that in view of framing of the charge, the petitioner be suspended from the office of Sarpanch. Pursuance to the said complaint, the respondent No.3, i.e. Sub -Divisional Officer, issued a show cause notice on 23.1.96 (Annexure P/2) to the petitioner asking him to show cause that as charges under section 395/94, 394/34 and 506 IPC have been framed against the petitioner in Sessions Trial No. 447/95 by the IVth Additional Sessions Judge,' Link Court, Mungeli, District Bilaspur, therefore, why an action under section 39 (1) (a) be not taken against the petitioner. The petitioner, vide Annexure P/3, dated 29.1.96, filed his reply and also made a submission that he be given some more time to file a detailed reply. The matter was again taken up on 2.2.96 for consideration. In case No. 27 -BI21/95 -96, the Sub -Divisional Officer holding that as the charges have already been framed against the petitioner, under section 39 (1) (a) of M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, the petitioner deserves to be suspended. He accordingly suspended the petitioner. On the same day, i.e. 2.2.96, the Sub -Divisional Officer gave the charge of the office of Sarpanch to the Up -Sarpanch. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal against the said order of Sub -Divisional Officer; the appeal was registered as Revenue Case No. 20/B -128/95 -96. The appellate authority by its order dated 19.3.96, rejected the appeal holding that as charges under section 395/34, 394/34 and 506 IPC have already been framed against the petitioner, the petitioner could not escape the consequences flowing from section 39. Thereafter vide Annexure, dated 13.5.96, the petitioner submitted an application to the Sub -Divisional Officer that the petitioner was suspended from the office vide communication dated 5.2.96, but as the said suspension order has not been confirmed by the State Government within ninety days as provided under section 39 (2) of the Act, said order deemed to stand discharged, therefore, the petitioner be permitted to occupy the office. By Annexure P/8, the petitioner again moved an application to the Sub -Divisional Officer seeking the same relief. The petitioner again took up the matter to the Addl. Collector. The Addl. Collector, by his order dated 7.12.96, passed in Panchayat Appeal Case No. 21 -B/128 -95 -96, rejected the appeal holding that the order of suspension has already been confirmed by the State Government on 24.5.96, and as the petitioner could again be suspended, therefore, and as the petitioner was facing serious charges, it was not in the interest of all concerned that the office be restored to the petitioner. Being dissatisfied by the order of passed by the Addl. Collector on 7.12.96 (Annexure P/9), the petitioner has filed this petition.

(3.) FACING this factual problem, learned counsel for the petitioner now contended that the order was not communicated within ten days in accordance with section 39 (2) of the Act, therefore, it must be held that the first part of section 39 (2) was not complied with and the order lost its efficacy immediately on completion of ten days or in any case the State Government could not confirm the order beyond ninety days from the date of issuance of the suspension order. Learned Government Advocate, in reply, submitted that section 39 (2) cannot be interpreted in a manner as being interpreted by the petitioner. According to him, section 39'(2) provides that the order of suspension has to be confirmed by the State Government within ninety days from the date of receipt and non -compliance or non -observance of the mandatory provision of non -confirn1ation would alone lead to penal consequences. He submits that law does not provide for penal consequences if the order is not communicated to the State Government within ten days.