SUKHLAL Vs. MURTI SHRI. KRISHNACHAND ANANDBIHARIJI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12.2.1996 passed by Xth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur (MP.) in Civil Appeal No. 9 -A/94, arising out of the judgment and decree dated 21.4.1994 passed by 1st Civil Judge, Class -I, Jabalpur (MP.) in Civil Suit No. 52 -A/94.

(2.) THE respondents described themselves in the cause title of memo of appeal as trustees of the Murti Shri Kirshnachand Anandbihariji at House No. 1/393, Kotwali Ward, Miloniganj, Jabalpur a private trust. They claimed that they are the landlords of the accommodation bearing Municipal Corporation No. 279 situate of South Miloniganj, Jabalpur (MP.). They claimed to be the owners and landlords of the aforesaid accommodation. It was stated by them in the plaint that the appellant was the tenant of a part of the aforesaid accommodation on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/ - (Rupees Twenty Five) per month. This part was particularly described in the plaint map in red colour and marked by letters ABCDEFGHIJKLM in the plaint map. It was claimed that the tenancy was oral. The respondents alleged in the plaint that the appellant had not paid the arrears of rent from 1.11.1986 to 31.5.1988 amounting to Rs. 475/ - (Rupees Four Hundred Seventy Five) despite the notice of demand dated 14.7.1988 and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(a) of the MP. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (henceforth 'the Act'). The second ground raised by the respondents was that the appellant had parted that possession of the suit house in favour of a vegetable seller by permitting him to sell the vegetables in the front varandah of the suit house. It was further claimed that the appellant's son Kishanlal was handed over possession of the remaining portion of the house. Kishanlal was not the member of family of the appellant as he has separated from the family. Thus, on the aforesaid two counts eviction under section 12(1)(b) of 'the Act' was sought. The third ground for eviction was based on Section 12(1)(c) of 'the Act'. It was claimed that the suit house was let out for non -residential purpose but Kishanlal was using it for his residence, therefore, ground under Section 12(1)(c) of 'the Act' was made out. The fourth ground for eviction was based on Section 12(1)(i) of 'the Act'. It was stated that the appellant had acquired vacant possession of his own house and he was doing the business in that house and, therefore, also he was liable to be evicted. The fifth ground for eviction was based on Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act'. Although, the plea therein appears to be a rolled plea. It is an admixture of ground under Section 12(1)(g) and 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' but the pleadings of the respondents show that they require the suit house for demolishing the structure and re -building it and claimed that the same cannot be Carried out without the house being vacated by the appellant. Yet another ground was raised under Section 12(1)(m) of 'the Act' on the allegation that the appellant had constructed a Tapra in the varandah of the ground floor which was let out to the vegetable seller. It was also claimed that a latrine was also constructed by the appellant shown in the plaint map in green colour. The act of constructing a Tapra and latrine was done without the permission of the respondent. It was claimed that the alterations made by the appellant resulted in the detriment of the respondents and reduced the value of the suit house substantially. For this reason, the appellant was liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(m) of 'the Act'.

(3.) ON these pleadings, the parties went to trial. The trial Court held that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and the appellant. It was also held by the trial Court that the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 were the owners of the suit house as it was admitted by the appellant in his evidence. It was also found by the trial Court that it was not proved that the appellant was in arrears of rent from 1.11.1986. It was further found by the trial Court that it was not proved by the respondents that the accommodation in question was given by the appellant to his son Kishanlal who had separated. Thus, the trial Court held that so far as parting with possession by the appellant to Kishanlal was concerned, the respondents could not prove their case. It was held by the trial Court that the appellant did not possess separate building of his own for the purpose of running his business. The trial Court however, found that the son of the appellant Kishanlal was using the suit accommodation for residential purpose. It was also held that the suit house required substantial repairs and for this purpose the respondents were entitled to a decree under Section 12(1)(h) of 'the Act' as they had pleaded that they wanted to reconstruct the house. The trial Court also found that far as the ground of the respondents were that a portion of the house was let out by the appellant after constructing a Tapra to one Pancham Lal Patel was proved by the respondents, therefore, a decree under Section 12(1)(b) of 'the Act' on the ground of parting with possession to Pancham Lal Patel was made out. The trial Court also granted decree under Section 12(1)(m) of 'the Act' on the ground that the appellant had constructed a Tapra and latrine in the suit accommodation and for those reasons, the appellant was liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(m) of 'the Act'. Accordingly, the suit of the respondents was decreed.