(1.) ONE Leela Devi filed a petition under Chapter III-A of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). She was seeking eviction for her own need. According to her, she wanted to do some retail business. Her plea was that she is a landlady Under Section 23-J of the Act. This application was taken up by the Rent Controlling Authority. Leela Devi died. Thereafter, an application was filed by Hemant Kumar in which he took a plea that he be permitted to continue with the proceedings as the premises are required for the need of his son. This prayer was allowed by the Rent Controlling Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Authority ). This order was challenged in this Court by filing civil revision No. 98 of 1997. In this petition, it was observed that Hemant Kumar was not within his rights to claim eviction under Chapter III-A for the need of a person who was grandson of the original landlord. However, at the same time, in paras 7 and 8 following observations were made :
(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the very decision which was earlier relied upon by him when Civil Revision No. 98 of 1997 was decided. This decision is Nabi Ahmed v. Ramprakash Rastogi, 1989 MPRCJ 482. In the above case, R. C. Lahoti, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that in the event of death of landlord, his legal representatives can seek amendment to be substituted as their own need as basis of cause of action. Position in this case is no different. Apart from the aforementioned decision, under somewhat similar circumstances, same view was expressed in Civil Revision No. 16 of 1996. In the above case, a suit was filed Under Section 12 (1) (d) and (f) of the Act. The landlord was Mahavir. He died. Later on, his grandsons wanted to participate in the proceedings by filing an application under Order 6, Rule 17. This prayer was disallowed. This order was challenged. It was held that the death of the original landlord and the need of his grandsons would equally be covered by the term "subsequent event" as visualised by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711. After taking note of the arguments so raised following observations were made in para 7.
(3.) IN view of the decision given in Nabi Ahmed and in Dinanath's case referred to above, it can safely be said that a legal representative can pursue the matter even where the need which was originally mentioned was of the landlord who had died.