VIRENDRA KUMAR SAKLECHA Vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an application under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order dated 28-5-1984 passed by Shri L. J. Mandlik, Special Judge, Bhopal in Special Case No. 2 of 1983 framing charges against the applicant under Section 5 (1) (e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ).

(2.) THE applicant was a Minister of Industries of the State of Madhya Pradesh from 27-6-1977 to 17-1-1978, after which he became the Chief Minister with effect from 18-1-1978 and continued as such upto 19-1-1980. It is alleged that he has been found in possession of properties worth Rs. 57,61,101/- which was disproportionate to his known sources of income and for which he cannot satisfactorily account. He is, therefore, alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 5 (1) (e) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After the charge-sheet was filed and the applicant appeared before the learned Special Judge, objections to the validity of the trial and his prosecution were taken, which remain disposed of by the order impugned. That explains why and how the applicant has approached this Court invoking its revisional jurisdiction, as aforesaid.

(3.) THE submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the investigation of the offence was wholly illegal and unauthorised being violative of Section 5-A (1) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the investigation was carried on by Shri V. N. Pandit, Dy. Superintendent of Police, Shri Y. K. Tiwari, Shri U. N. Singh and Shri M. L. Yadav, Inspectors of Police, and was illegal, inasmuch as, there was no order of the Superintendent of Police authorising these persons by name. According to the learned counsel, a general authorisation without giving reasons does not meet the legal requirements of this provision. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Special Judge has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the crime and frame the charge. Referring to Section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it is submitted that since the applicant had not been afforded an opportunity to satisfactorily account for the money in question, it must be held that the investigation is incomplete and charge-sheet premature. It is further submitted that the evidence collected during investigation and presented to the learned Special Judge does not even prim a facie disclose commission of an offence under Section 5 (1) (e) or Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and hence the impugned order, is illegal. The learned Dy. Advocate General, however, submitted that there is no illegality in the authorisation or the investigation. Referring to the Notification published in 1980 M. P. Law Times (Part II), page 12, it is submitted that some selected Inspectors of Police have been authorised to carry on investigation in all such cases and, therefore, the investigation was legal and valid. It is further submitted that not only Shri V. N. Pandit, D. S. P. , but also 13 other Inspectors of Police have been properly authorised to conduct the investigation in the instant case and, therefore, the investigation has been done by persons having jurisdiction in the matter. It is also submitted that Investigating Officer had requested the applicant more than once to explain how the aforesaid amount has been accumulated/possessed by him, but he has failed to do so and, therefore, prosecution has been left with no other alternative than to file the charge-sheet. It is further submitted that the evidence on record consists of 843 documents and 314 witnesses and is sufficient to indicate existence of a prima facie case against the applicant It is further submitted that the applicant, by filing the present application, is making an unnecessary effort to delay the trial and cause embarrassment to all concerned. A prayer is, therefore, made to reject the revision. It is further submitted that the present revision is not maintainable in view of the decisions in V. C. Shukla v. State of M. P. , AIR 1980 SC 962 and Praful Turkhia v. Sewa Ram Rajput, 1982 JLJ Short Note 34. Section 5-A of the Act provides for the Police Officers who are authorised to investigate any offence under Section 5 without the order of the Magistrate. As far as our State is concerned, no Police Officer below the rank of Dy. Superintendent of Police has this authority. This, however, is the general rule and admits several exceptions. The first exception to this rule is that an Inspector of Police authorised by the State Government in this behalf may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Magistrate. The second exception is in relation to offence under Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act and provides that it shall not be investigated without the Order of a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. The purpose of this provision is to prevent harassment of a public servant by requiring application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. In spite of it, it has been held by Supreme Court in Khandu Sonu Dhobi and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 958 that a trial held would not be rendered illegal because of invalidity of preceding investigation nor conviction of an accused would be vitiated as a result of such trial, unless it is shown that the accused has been prejudiced because of the illegality in investigation. However, since the challenge is made at the beginning of the trial, the question of prejudice caused to the applicant during the trial does not arise. In spite of it, the complaint being concerned with an illegality must be examined. The complaint of the applicant appears to be that the State Government has generally authorised all Inspectors of Police attached to the Criminal Investigation Department (Economic Offences) Wing, Bhopal without naming any particular Inspector and hence this authorisation does not meet the requirements of proviso to Section 5-A (1) of the Act This Court is unable to find any substance in the submission. A bare reading of the proviso indicates that the State Government is entitled to authorise Inspectors of Police by general or special order. The word 'general' as an adjective to the word 'order' sufficiently indicates that the authorisation does not have to be either to a particular Police Officer or in relation to a particular offence. The authorisation in the instant case is specifically issued under this provision and is intended to authorise all Inspectors working in a particular establishment. This apparently meets the requirement of the provision. It is true that the Government can also authorise any particular Inspector of Police to conduct investigation in a particular case, but such authorisation would be a special authorisation not general. Since the power conferred by this provision is to issue both types of authorisation, this Court finds no illegality in the authorisation issued.