MAHESHKUMAR Vs. ADDL COLLECTOR HOSHANGABAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner filed his nomination paper claiming to be an agriculturist for election as Member of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Banapura His nomination paper was accepted. He contested the election and was duly elected. Voter Kailash, son of Mathura Prasad filed an election petition questioning the petitioner's election on the ground inter alia that the petitioner was not 'an 'agriculturist' within the meaning of S.2(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') as he was engaged in doing cloth business as a partner with his brothers. The heard the election petition found that the petitioner was a partner in a Firm which still exists and carries on cloth business. For this conclusion certain circumstances apart from oral testimony have been relied upon. Petitioner's statement that he was a partner in a Firm which was engaged in cloth business has also been taken into consideration. On this finding, it has been held that the petitioner was not entitled to contest the election as an agriculturist. Shri Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in view of the definition of the term 'agriculturist' contained in S.2(b) of the Adhiniyam, the petitioner should have been held to be an agriculturist.

(2.) In order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner it shall be useful to quote the definition of the term 'agriculturist' contained in S.2(b) of the Adhiniyam. It is as follows :- 2(b) "agriculturist" means a person whose source of livelihood is wholly dependent on agricultural produce and who cultivates land on one's own accounts :

(3.) We are not impressed with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word 'wholly' occurring in the main clause of definition should be ignored in view of the subsequent clauses expressing the intention of the legislature that there should be representation by persons engaged in agriculture and capable of promoting agriculture. Learned counsel submitted that the literal meaning will defeat the object of the Adhiniyam. In our opinion there is no room for such a construction. It is now well settled that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. In Emperor v. Benoarilal Sharma, AIR 1945 PC 48 Viscount Simonds, L.C. said "Again and again this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise which may follow from giving effect to the language used". In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh AIR 1954 SC 749 S.R. Das, J. observed. "The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the Sections of the Act". The rule is that after construing the words if the conclusion is that they can bear only one meaning, the duty is to give effect to that meaning. It is also settled rule of construction that while on one hand it is not permissible to add words or to fill any gap or lacuna, efforts on the other hand should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by legislature. Patanjali Shastry, C.J. in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda, Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 at P. 377 said to brush aside words in a statute as being inappropriate surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute (Sic). The legislature is not supposed to waste words or to say just anything in vain. A construction which attributes redundancy to legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Such is the rule laid down in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax AIR 1964 SC 766.