LACHIYABAI Vs. DARSHAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The claimant comes from a rural background. She used to earn her livelihood as a daily labourer. Because she suffered a serious injury which left her cripple, she lodged a claim under S.110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the Act, for compensation. The application was duly entertained by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Guna, for short, the Tribunal. The vehicle was self-driven and the owner filed written statement, but admitted position also is that he did not enter into the witness box. The Insurance Company was also impleaded, but filed no written statement and even did not examine any witness in support of its case.

(2.) We are indeed not amused at all, but are rather taken aback reading the impugned award. There is a discussion on merit on all aspects of the claim and findings are recorded on the material questions and yet, holding the application to be time-barred, the claim was rejected. One material finding which is assailed seriously in this appeal we may refer at once. The respondents were absolved of the liability also on the ground that negligence of the Driver wins not pleaded and rashness was not proved. However, evidence was still assessed on the question of quantum of compensation and the Tribunal took the view that for loss of her earning, the claimant could lay a claim for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- only ignoring, however, that for pain and suffering also she was entitled to compensation, and that her loss could be reckoned at Rs.40,000/- as she earned @ Rs. 5/- per day and was aged 35.

(3.) We propose to address ourselves to the first question, that of limitation. S.110A of the Act, in terms, vide Proviso to sub-sec. (3), contemplates that the "Claims. Tribunal may entertain an application after expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from not making the application in time". Rules framed by the State of Madhya Pradesh, under the Act, provide the procedure for making application for compensation envisaged under S.110A and under Rule 277(2), the requirement contemplated is that such application shall be either presented in person or sent by registered post to the Claims Tribunal. The view taken by the Tribunal in this case is that no sufficient cause has been made out on evidence by the claimant to condone delay in filing the application and the delay was of 2 months and 17 days. The fact which has been considered immaterial in our view, was most material to the question of determination of the issue of belated lodgment of the claim. The claimant was confined to bed in the hospital for a period of 2 1/2 months and further the fact also is undisputed that her husband, though alive, was too a rustic villager and an economically deprived person. Whether, therefore, under Rule 277(2) aforesaid, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it could be said that there was any deliberate delay in the lodgment of the claim is the real question and the facts and circumstances, on the other hand, leave no doubt that there was "sufficient cause" for the claim to be lodged belatedly on the ground of confinement in hospital of the claimant and also her husband being illiterate and poverty-striken. We accordingly hold that the application could not be thrown out and indeed at the stage of hearing after it had been duly entertained for heating and disposal. The finding of the Tribunal on the question of limitation is accordingly set aside.