(1.) Appellant Ramakant, a young boy aged 21 years, stands convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code, for causing murder of his wife Pushpabai, about 18 years or age.
(2.) A business magnate Shri Kantilal Tolia is the proprietor of Tolia Tiles factory at Indore, Khandwa Road. Within the premises, he had some rooms (kholis) where employees coming from outside Khandwa town were permitted to reside. One of such employees was the appellant. He was then recently married and by virtue of his employment in the said tiles factory, was permitted to live in one of those rooms with his young wife Pushpabai. The room so allotted to the appellant for his residence just adjoined the building where Kantilal Tolia used to hold his office. Rumours spread that Kantilal Tolia would summon young lady workers to his office and with the power and money that he had, would make them succumb to his desires. It has been the case of the prosecution that Kamalabai (P.W. 6) was employed by Shri Kantilal Tolia to persuade Pushpabai to join Kantilal Tolia and satisfy his sexual desires. Pushpabai at first hesitated but ultimately when on 9-5-1982 the appellant had gone out of Khandwa for some job, Kamalabai succeeded in her evil design and Pushpabai was made to go to the office of Kantilal Tolia where Kantilal Tolia committed adultery with Pushpabai. On 11-5.1982 the appellant returned Pushpabai, however, remained quiet and made no complaint either against Kamalabai or against Kantilal Tolia. Karansingh (P.W. 2) and Labhkunwar (P.W. 5) had noticed Pushpabai going to the office of Kantilal Tolia and they are alleged to have given this information to the appellant. This unsettled the appellant completely. He decided to immediately leave the room and service and quit Khandwa. He even took out his luggage and also asked the deceased to be ready to leave Khandwa. Before, however, he finally left the place, he went to the factory office and had a word with Kantilal Tolia on the subject. Kantilal Tolia, of course, denied the allegation and immediately asked the appellant to quit the premises. Appellant came back to his room where he found his wife Pushpabai standing in the open space in front of the house. The prosecution case further is that finding a bottle of kerosene oil there, he poured it on Pushpabai and set fire to her. Pushpabai was then removed to the hospital where her dying declaration was recorded, vide Ex. P/8 by Naib-Tahsildar Radha Krishna Verma (P.W. 16) at about 7.15 P.M. She ultimately succumbed to the burn injuries. When after due investigation, the challan was filed, the trial Court accepted the prosecution story and relying upon the dying declaration held the appellant guilty of intentionally causing death of his wife Pushpabai. On these findings, the appellant has been convicted, as aforesaid, and has been sentenced to imprisonment for life.
(3.) Pushpabai died of burn injuries was not even denied by the appellant during his examination under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code. Although he denied to have caused those injuries, the prosecution has established beyond doubt that it is the appellant who is guilty of setting fire to his wife Pushpabai. Reference in this regard may be made to the dying declaration (Ex. P/8) made by Pushpabai and recorded by Naib Tahsildar Radha Krishna Verma (P.W.16). His deposition would show that be had all precautions in that behalf and had ascertained that Pushpabai was in a position to make a coherent statement. The statement (Ex. P/8) so recorded does not bear her signature. This has been explained by the witness stating that her fingers were also burnt. A lock at the dying declaration so recorded by this witness would show that the deceased had made a very clear statement as to the cause of her death. She has given alidetails in answer to the questions that were put to her. The certificate of the doctor annexed to the statement also shows that she was in full senses when the statement began and when it ended. There is no reason why the statement of the Naib Tahsildar an absolutely independent witness, be not accepted. The testimony of this witness is entitled to all credit and must be accepted despite the statement of Kamalabai (P.W. 6) who has tried to shield the appellant and has stated that at the time of incident the appellant was seen by her from behind the house. She is a woman who all the relevant time was herself being prosecuted on a charge under section 376, Indian Penal Code. The trial Court rightly ignored her testimony. The law does permit an inference of guilt against an accused even on a charge of murder on the sole testimony of dying declaration provided it is coherent and trustworthy. This is how the Supreme Court, in State of Assam v. Mufizuddin1 has expressed itself on the subject: There can be conviction on the basis of dying declaration and it is not at all necessary to have a corroboration provided the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is a truthful dying declaration and not vitiated in any other manner.T Accepting the dying declaration (Ex. P/8) and relying upon it, we hold the appellant guilty of causing death of his wife Pushpabai by pouring kerosene oil and then setting fire to her.